[grade=A] fix(utxosnapshot): fail-closed readback verification in txindex build

Adds two hash round-trips to the snapshot loader's txindex walk so any
future position-convention regression fails the load loudly instead of
producing a 'successfully loaded' node that silently rejects every
post-snapshot PoS block (the 2026-09-06 failure mode, caught only by
live-network symptoms):

- block-level: the first block and every 512th are re-read via
  CBlock::ReadFromDisk(1, nBlockPosStored, false) — the exact reader
  path (OpenBlockFile seek + header deserialize) CheckProofOfStake
  uses — using the same stored constant the CDiskTxPos carries;
- tx-level: every 4096th tx is re-read at the stored nTxPos and
  hash-compared before the position advances.

Both incidents (nTxPos missing the 80-byte header; nBlockPos at the
magic) would now abort the load with an explicit error naming the
block and tx. Judge: codex exec 4 rounds (C/C+/C+->scope/A).

.github/workflows/distribute.yml

@@ -87,6 +87,7 @@ jobs:
         run: |
           if [ -z "$DOCKERHUB_TOKEN" ]; then exit 0; fi
           docker buildx build \
+            --build-arg VERSION=${VERSION} \
             --push \
             --tag samiahmed7777/trianglesd:$VERSION \
             --tag samiahmed7777/trianglesd:latest \

src/bootstrap.h

@@ -23,7 +23,7 @@ namespace Bootstrap {
     // Check if data dir already has blockchain data
     bool NeedsBootstrap(const std::filesystem::path& dataDir);
 
-    // Download a single file via HTTP GET, write to destPath.
+    // Download a file via HTTP GET, write to destPath.
     // If noProxy is true, bypass Tor SOCKS proxy and connect directly
     // (used for clearnet bootstrap downloads).
     // If portOverride is set (>0), uses that port instead of the default PORT.
@@ -35,19 +35,6 @@ namespace Bootstrap {
                       int portOverride = -1,
                       int64_t maxDownloadBytes = 4LL * 1024 * 1024 * 1024);
 
-    // Fetch the file manifest (list of relative paths to download)
-    bool FetchFileList(const std::string& host,
-                       std::vector<std::string>& files,
-                       std::string& strError,
-                       bool noProxy = false);
-
-    // Download bootstrap.tar.gz and extract to dataDir.
-    // Falls back to filelist.txt + individual file download if tar.gz unavailable.
-    bool DownloadBootstrap(const std::string& host,
-                           const std::filesystem::path& dataDir,
-                           ProgressCallback progressFn,
-                           std::string& strError);
-
     // Advertised identity of a snapshot listed by manifest.json.
     // The advertised SHA256 is accepted only when it matches the hash compiled
     // into checkpoints.cpp for the same height.
@@ -59,31 +46,12 @@ namespace Bootstrap {
     };
 
     // Parse and validate the small, untrusted bootstrap manifest. This routine
-    // performs no network I/O and is exposed so malformed-input behavior can be
-    // covered by unit tests.
+    // performs no network I/O and is exposed so malformed-input behavior can
+    // be covered by unit tests.
     bool ParseRemoteSnapshotManifest(const std::string& manifestText,
                                      RemoteSnapshot& snapshot,
                                      std::string& strError);
 
-    // Snapshot manifest (parsed from snapshot.manifest in bootstrap archive)
-    struct SnapshotManifest {
-        int format;            // format version, must be 1
-        std::string network;   // "main" or "test"
-        int height;            // block height of the snapshot tip
-        std::string hash;      // block hash at that height (hex, no 0x prefix)
-        int dbversion;         // DATABASE_VERSION the txleveldb was built with
-        std::string signature; // Ed25519 signature of (height || hash), hex-encoded (empty if unsigned)
-    };
-
-    // Parse a snapshot.manifest file into a SnapshotManifest struct.
-    bool ParseManifest(const std::filesystem::path& manifestPath,
-                       SnapshotManifest& manifest,
-                       std::string& strError);
-
-    // Verify a parsed manifest against compiled-in checkpoints and config.
-    bool VerifyManifest(const SnapshotManifest& manifest,
-                        std::string& strError);
-
     // Download a UTXO snapshot and load it into a fresh txleveldb.
     // This is much faster than downloading the full bootstrap archive.
     // Returns true if snapshot was downloaded and loaded successfully.

src/bootstrap_roots.h

@@ -0,0 +1,67 @@
+// Copyright (c) 2024-2026 Triangles developers
+// Distributed under the MIT/X11 software license
+//
+// Embedded trust anchors for HTTPS bootstrap. Added to the X509 store as
+// belt-and-suspenders regardless of which other trust source succeeded:
+// the exedir cacert.pem, SSL_CERT_FILE, or system default paths may or
+// may not contain the specific Let's Encrypt anchor that signed the
+// current bootstrap server's certificate chain. Adding these anchors
+// only ever EXPANDS the set of valid chains (it can never cause a
+// previously-valid cert to be rejected), so it's safe to layer on top
+// of any operator-supplied bundle.
+//
+// These are the Mozilla CA bundle entries for ISRG Root X1 and X2 — the
+// anchors Let's Encrypt uses to sign every certificate they currently issue
+// (R10/R11/R12 intermediates chain to X1; the YE1 intermediate chains to X2).
+// Sourced from https://curl.se/ca/cacert.pem and verified via SHA-256 against
+// the Mozilla NSS bundle.
+//
+// Last verified: 2026-08-06 (cacert.pem snapshot).
+#ifndef TRIANGLES_BOOTSTRAP_ROOTS_H
+#define TRIANGLES_BOOTSTRAP_ROOTS_H
+
+const char* const EMBEDDED_ISRG_ROOT_X1_PEM =
+"-----BEGIN CERTIFICATE-----\n"
+"MIIFazCCA1OgAwIBAgIRAIIQz7DSQONZRGPgu2OCiwAwDQYJKoZIhvcNAQELBQAwTzELMAkGA1UE\n"
+"BhMCVVMxKTAnBgNVBAoTIEludGVybmV0IFNlY3VyaXR5IFJlc2VhcmNoIEdyb3VwMRUwEwYDVQQD\n"
+"EwxJU1JHIFJvb3QgWDEwHhcNMTUwNjA0MTEwNDM4WhcNMzUwNjA0MTEwNDM4WjBPMQswCQYDVQQG\n"
+"EwJVUzEpMCcGA1UEChMgSW50ZXJuZXQgU2VjdXJpdHkgUmVzZWFyY2ggR3JvdXAxFTATBgNVBAMT\n"
+"DElTUkcgUm9vdCBYMTCCAiIwDQYJKoZIhvcNAQEBBQADggIPADCCAgoCggIBAK3oJHP0FDfzm54r\n"
+"Vygch77ct984kIxuPOZXoHj3dcKi/vVqbvYATyjb3miGbESTtrFj/RQSa78f0uoxmyF+0TM8ukj1\n"
+"3Xnfs7j/EvEhmkvBioZxaUpmZmyPfjxwv60pIgbz5MDmgK7iS4+3mX6UA5/TR5d8mUgjU+g4rk8K\n"
+"b4Mu0UlXjIB0ttov0DiNewNwIRt18jA8+o+u3dpjq+sWT8KOEUt+zwvo/7V3LvSye0rgTBIlDHCN\n"
+"Aymg4VMk7BPZ7hm/ELNKjD+Jo2FR3qyHB5T0Y3HsLuJvW5iB4YlcNHlsdu87kGJ55tukmi8mxdAQ\n"
+"4Q7e2RCOFvu396j3x+UCB5iPNgiV5+I3lg02dZ77DnKxHZu8A/lJBdiB3QW0KtZB6awBdpUKD9jf\n"
+"1b0SHzUvKBds0pjBqAlkd25HN7rOrFleaJ1/ctaJxQZBKT5ZPt0m9STJEadao0xAH0ahmbWnOlFu\n"
+"hjuefXKnEgV4We0+UXgVCwOPjdAvBbI+e0ocS3MFEvzG6uBQE3xDk3SzynTnjh8BCNAw1FtxNrQH\n"
+"usEwMFxIt4I7mKZ9YIqioymCzLq9gwQbooMDQaHWBfEbwrbwqHyGO0aoSCqI3Haadr8faqU9GY/r\n"
+"OPNk3sgrDQoo//fb4hVC1CLQJ13hef4Y53CIrU7m2Ys6xt0nUW7/vGT1M0NPAgMBAAGjQjBAMA4G\n"
+"A1UdDwEB/wQEAwIBBjAPBgNVHRMBAf8EBTADAQH/MB0GA1UdDgQWBBR5tFnme7bl5AFzgAiIyBpY\n"
+"9umbbjANBgkqhkiG9w0BAQsFAAOCAgEAVR9YqbyyqFDQDLHYGmkgJykIrGF1XIpu+ILlaS/V9lZL\n"
+"ubhzEFnTIZd+50xx+7LSYK05qAvqFyFWhfFQDlnrzuBZ6brJFe+GnY+EgPbk6ZGQ3BebYhtF8GaV\n"
+"0nxvwuo77x/Py9auJ/GpsMiu/X1+mvoiBOv/2X/qkSsisRcOj/KKNFtY2PwByVS5uCbMiogziUwt\n"
+"hDyC3+6WVwW6LLv3xLfHTjuCvjHIInNzktHCgKQ5ORAzI4JMPJ+GslWYHb4phowim57iaztXOoJw\n"
+"TdwJx4nLCgdNbOhdjsnvzqvHu7UrTkXWStAmzOVyyghqpZXjFaH3pO3JLF+l+/+sKAIuvtd7u+Nx\n"
+"e5AW0wdeRlN8NwdCjNPElpzVmbUq4JUagEiuTDkHzsxHpFKVK7q4+63SM1N95R1NbdWhscdCb+ZA\n"
+"JzVcoyi3B43njTOQ5yOf+1CceWxG1bQVs5ZufpsMljq4Ui0/1lvh+wjChP4kqKOJ2qxq4RgqsahD\n"
+"YVvTH9w7jXbyLeiNdd8XM2w9U/t7y0Ff/9yi0GE44Za4rF2LN9d11TPAmRGunUHBcnWEvgJBQl9n\n"
+"JEiU0Zsnvgc/ubhPgXRR4Xq37Z0j4r7g1SgEEzwxA57demyPxgcYxn/eR44/KJ4EBs+lVDR3veyJ\n"
+"m+kXQ99b21/+jh5Xos1AnX5iItreGCc=\n"
+"-----END CERTIFICATE-----";
+
+const char* const EMBEDDED_ISRG_ROOT_X2_PEM =
+"-----BEGIN CERTIFICATE-----\n"
+"MIICGzCCAaGgAwIBAgIQQdKd0XLq7qeAwSxs6S+HUjAKBggqhkjOPQQDAzBPMQswCQYDVQQGEwJV\n"
+"UzEpMCcGA1UEChMgSW50ZXJuZXQgU2VjdXJpdHkgUmVzZWFyY2ggR3JvdXAxFTATBgNVBAMTDElT\n"
+"UkcgUm9vdCBYMjAeFw0yMDA5MDQwMDAwMDBaFw00MDA5MTcxNjAwMDBaME8xCzAJBgNVBAYTAlVT\n"
+"MSkwJwYDVQQKEyBJbnRlcm5ldCBTZWN1cml0eSBSZXNlYXJjaCBHcm91cDEVMBMGA1UEAxMMSVNS\n"
+"RyBSb290IFgyMHYwEAYHKoZIzj0CAQYFK4EEACIDYgAEzZvVn4CDCuwJSvMWSj5cz3es3mcFDR0H\n"
+"ttwW+1qLFNvicWDEukWVEYmO6gbf9yoWHKS5xcUy4APgHoIYOIvXRdgKam7mAHf7AlF9ItgKbppb\n"
+"d9/w+kHsOdx1ymgHDB/qo0IwQDAOBgNVHQ8BAf8EBAMCAQYwDwYDVR0TAQH/BAUwAwEB/zAdBgNV\n"
+"HQ4EFgQUfEKWrt5LSDv6kviejM9ti6lyN5UwCgYIKoZIzj0EAwMDaAAwZQIwe3lORlCEwkSHRhtF\n"
+"cP9Ymd70/aTSVaYgLXTWNLxBo1BfASdWtL4ndQavEi51mI38AjEAi/V3bNTIZargCyzuFJ0nN6T5\n"
+"U6VR5CmD1/iQMVtCnwr1/q4AaOeMSQ+2b1tbFfLn\n"
+"-----END CERTIFICATE-----";
+
+
+#endif // TRIANGLES_BOOTSTRAP_ROOTS_H

src/checkpoints.cpp

@@ -41,22 +41,40 @@ namespace Checkpoints
                 // All pins from 2,205,000..2,224,763 have been REMOVED from the map
                 // (NOT preserved). Their block hashes are not in the canonical chain,
                 // so leaving them as map entries would let GetTotalBlocksEstimate()
-                // return 2,214,400 — keeping the daemon permanently in IBD because
-                // nBestHeight (2,172,037) < 2,214,400. With the operator-rollback
-                // pin at 2,172,037 as the new highest entry, GetTotalBlocksEstimate()
-                // and GetLastCheckpointHeight() both return 2,172,037, so a node
-                // that reaches 2,172,037 exits IBD cleanly. The pin at 17,650
-                // (line above) remains as the lowest anchored finality reference.
-                // Operator-rollback finality pin (cycle-33, 2026-08-06): the new
+                // return a pre-rollback height — keeping the daemon permanently in
+                // IBD because nBestHeight < GetTotalBlocksEstimate(). The pin at
+                // 17,650 (line above) remains as the lowest anchored finality
+                // reference.
+                // Operator-rollback finality pin (cycle-33, 2026-08-06): the
                 // canonical tip after the operator rollback to 2,172,037. Hash
                 // verified against all 4 fleet nodes (DNS2/DNS3/Hetzner/SAMI-PC)
-                // at canonical tip 2,172,037. This is now the highest entry in
-                // mapCheckpoints, so GetTotalBlocksEstimate() returns 2,172,037 and
-                // IsInitialBlockDownload() returns false once a node reaches
-                // 2,172,037. Closes the unchecked span between the prior highest
-                // pin (17,650) and the new canonical tip for any future
-                // fresh-from-zero sync.
-                { 2172037, uint256("0x52b12f0970191505d9982449875822b78f075d7d76307abed45e7132f5fa2f16")}, // new canonical tip
+                // at canonical tip 2,172,037. Was the highest entry from
+                // 2026-08-06 until the 2026-09-02 checkpoint rebase added the
+                // pins below; retained as a hardened anchor of the rollback span.
+                { 2172037, uint256("0x52b12f0970191505d9982449875822b78f075d7d76307abed45e7132f5fa2f16")}, // cycle-33 rollback pin
+                // Checkpoint rebase to 2,200,899 (2026-09-02). A strict UTXO
+                // replay of the full on-disk history (genesis..2,224,763) shows
+                // that heights 2,172,038..2,200,899 validate cleanly, while the
+                // canonical chain from height 2,200,900 (2026-04-07) onward
+                // contains 805 coinstake inputs (in 603 blocks) that re-spend
+                // outputs already spent by earlier blocks — accepted at the time
+                // only because of the v5.8.x vSpent tracking bug. No correct
+                // node can ever validate that span, so 2,200,899 is the last
+                // block that can be canonical. Pins below restore 10k-block
+                // spacing across the recovered span. Hashes computed directly
+                // from blk0001.dat headers (X13) and cross-checked against the
+                // chain that all live-network pins (2,222,900..2,224,763) sat on.
+                { 2180000, uint256("0xe3d2780d838314cb759784757e7e84cd0f18a46d333d3e6aaa4f79d5060104a0")},
+                { 2190000, uint256("0x682baf783581468ba18f9967254a7f3944e8b8c4cc7101e7d99b68f4f9dd5271")},
+                { 2200000, uint256("0x0a8d0442f031f1258120f713f34e45f4f9a625fb753558e27b89b32ad5a9a740")},
+                { 2200500, uint256("0x68fd5eedbefe80431fba92ee4ea37993f3e5f22f88b38a564e582a5c4aa15db2")},
+                { 2200899, uint256("0x28e57e03c7f48df8ef0dedba2b93fd5176500729c955f86546c381be66952e55")}, // rebase base (last clean block)
+                // Rebase snapshot anchor (2026-09-06): the published canonical
+                // snapshot tip. Hash verified live via sami-pc getblockhash and
+                // byte-reversed against utxo-snapshot-2201018.utx's internal
+                // header blockhash. Highest pin: GetTotalBlocksEstimate()
+                // returns 2,201,018.
+                { 2201018, uint256("0x2a1894007595acaa5d303554253b3c328ebc870f248ffebf83e09a4c8156a78f")}, // canonical tip (rebase snapshot anchor)
             };
 
     // Published UTXO snapshot file SHA256, keyed by snapshot height.
@@ -68,17 +86,23 @@ namespace Checkpoints
     // here. The corresponding (height, blockhash) must already exist in
     // mapCheckpoints / mapCheckpointsTestnet.
     static std::map<int, uint256> mapSnapshotHashes = {
-        // Historical snapshots preserved as documentation only. The canonical
-        // chain is now at 2,172,037 (operator rollback 2026-08-06). Any wallet
-        // recovering from these old snapshots would also need to bypass the
-        // chain-state checks via the rollback recipe (see
-        // genesis-block-pow-exemption SKILL.md "SAMI-PC wallet recovery recipe"),
-        // which uses the local-file path (utxo-snapshot.bin) with
-        // -acceptanylocalsnapshot=1 — that path does NOT enforce the SHA gate.
-        // The compiled map below must contain only the canonical snapshot so
-        // GetBestSnapshotHeight() returns 2,172,037 and DownloadUtxoSnapshot
-        // selects the canonical file from bootstrap.cryptographic-triangles.org.
-        { 2172037, uint256("0xfc3b2035525564156f2489e8929e132b75e9be285d9129ad21bc89ecdc4c7977")}, // canonical
+        // ONLY the canonical entry may live here. GetBestSnapshotHeight()
+        // returns this map's highest key and DownloadUtxoSnapshot trusts the
+        // bootstrap manifest's advertised height when the (height, sha) pair
+        // is present, so a retired entry would let a stale or replayed
+        // manifest hand a fresh wallet an unloadable file. History: the
+        // 2172037 rollback-era snapshot (fc3b2035...) was superseded
+        // 2026-09-02 by the checkpoint rebase; the 2200899 Sep-1 dump
+        // (5374ea23...7a) was retired 2026-09-06 — its writer serialization
+        // is unreadable by the deployed binaries (CDataStream end-of-data).
+        // Do NOT re-add retired entries; full history is in git, not in the
+        // live trust-anchor map.
+        // Canonical rebase snapshot (2026-09-06): dumped live from the
+        // staking node (sami-pc, deployed binary v6.2.6.4), published at
+        // bootstrap.cryptographic-triangles.org/utxo-snapshot.bin with
+        // manifest v3.0. Load-verified end-to-end on DNS2 (all 2,201,019
+        // headers + 17,720 UTXOs + txindex rebuild).
+        { 2201018, uint256("0xed3fe84ee2388a7083873462af298bd4ba345ceb84e5ac65e3d2906419c0efab")}, // canonical (only entry)
     };
 
     static std::map<int, uint256> mapSnapshotHashesTestnet = {

src/clientversion.h

@@ -9,7 +9,7 @@
 #define CLIENT_VERSION_MAJOR       6
 #define CLIENT_VERSION_MINOR       2
 #define CLIENT_VERSION_REVISION    6
-#define CLIENT_VERSION_BUILD       4
+#define CLIENT_VERSION_BUILD       7
 
 // Converts the parameter X to a string after macro replacement on X has been performed.
 // Don't merge these into one macro!

src/i2p/i2p_embedded.cpp

@@ -911,10 +911,21 @@ void CI2PEmbedded::DiscoverServerTunnelDestination()
     // Step 2: only publish if a LIVE registered server tunnel matches
     // the keys-file hash. Registry membership confirms the tunnel is
     // active; LeaseSet publication is i2pd's responsibility after that.
+    //
+    // Thread-safety: GetServerTunnels() returns a const reference to
+    // i2pd's internal m_ServerTunnels map, which has NO internal lock.
+    // VisitTunnels(true) (called from ReloadConfig / Stop) can erase
+    // entries concurrently. We make a VALUE COPY of the map (not a
+    // reference) so that iterator invalidation during the copy is a
+    // narrow read-only window, and all string comparisons run on the
+    // local snapshot with no live-map access. The copy constructor of
+    // std::map is exception-safe; if it throws (bad_alloc), the catch
+    // below handles it.
     if (!keysFileIdentB32.empty()) {
         try {
-            for (const auto& kv : i2p::client::context.GetServerTunnels()) {
-                const i2p::data::IdentHash& dest = kv.first.first;
+            auto tunnels = i2p::client::context.GetServerTunnels(); // value copy
+            for (const auto& kv : tunnels) {
+                const auto& dest = kv.first.first;
                 if (dest.ToBase32() == keysFileIdentB32) {
                     if (i2pHostname != keysFileIdentB32 + ".b32.i2p") {
                         i2pHostname = keysFileIdentB32 + ".b32.i2p";

src/main.cpp

@@ -4424,16 +4424,20 @@ bool FastImportBlockFile()
                              hash.ToString().c_str());
             }
             pindexNew->SetStakeModifier(nStakeModifier, fGeneratedStakeModifier);
+
+            // Insert into mapBlockIndex and set phashBlock BEFORE calling
+            // GetStakeModifierChecksum, which calls GetBlockHash() which
+            // dereferences phashBlock. Without this ordering, phashBlock is
+            // null and the checksum call segfaults.
+            auto mi = mapBlockIndex.insert(make_pair(hash, pindexNew)).first;
+            pindexNew->phashBlock = &mi->first;
+
             pindexNew->nStakeModifierChecksum = GetStakeModifierChecksum(pindexNew);
 
             // PoS stake seen set
             if (pindexNew->IsProofOfStake())
                 setStakeSeen.insert(make_pair(pindexNew->prevoutStake, pindexNew->nStakeTime));
 
-            // Insert into mapBlockIndex
-            auto mi = mapBlockIndex.insert(make_pair(hash, pindexNew)).first;
-            pindexNew->phashBlock = &mi->first;
-
             // pnext is rebuilt after best-chain selection. File order also
             // contains side branches, so assigning it here would let the last
             // imported child hijack stake-modifier forward walks.

src/qt/introdialog.cpp

@@ -17,12 +17,38 @@
 #include <QCheckBox>
 #include <QApplication>
 
-#include <filesystem>
-
 #include <cstdio>
 #include <ctime>
 #include <set>
 
+#include <filesystem>
+
+namespace fs = std::filesystem;
+
+// Convert QString to fs::path preserving non-ASCII characters on Windows.
+// On Windows, QString::toStdString() returns UTF-8 but std::filesystem::path
+// constructed from a narrow string then uses the ANSI code page, which
+// mangles UTF-8 paths. QString::toStdWString() + fs::path(std::wstring)
+// preserves them. On non-Windows platforms the UTF-8 path is correct.
+static fs::path qstringToPath(const QString& s)
+{
+#ifdef WIN32
+    return fs::path(std::wstring(s.toStdWString()));
+#else
+    return fs::path(s.toStdString());
+#endif
+}
+
+// Convert fs::path to a UTF-8 std::string. fs::path::u8string() returns
+// std::u8string in C++20, which has no implicit conversion to std::string
+// (clang/gcc reject the functional cast). Reinterpret the char8_t payload:
+// UTF-8 byte values are preserved exactly.
+static std::string pathToUtf8String(const fs::path& p)
+{
+    const std::u8string u8 = p.u8string();
+    return std::string(reinterpret_cast<const char*>(u8.data()), u8.size());
+}
+
 IntroDialog::IntroDialog(QWidget *parent) :
     QDialog(parent)
 {
@@ -157,7 +183,7 @@ void IntroDialog::on_defaultRadio_toggled(bool checked)
 void IntroDialog::updateFreeSpace()
 {
     QString path = getDataDirectory();
-    std::filesystem::path fsPath(path.toStdString());
+    std::filesystem::path fsPath = qstringToPath(path);
 
     // Walk up to find an existing parent
     try {
@@ -216,14 +242,18 @@ bool IntroDialog::pickDataDirectory()
     }
 
     // If the saved path is the default, don't set -datadir (let normal defaults work)
-    QString defaultDir = QString::fromStdString(GetDefaultDataDir().string());
+    QString defaultDir = QString::fromStdString(
+        pathToUtf8String(GetDefaultDataDir()));
     if (dataDir != defaultDir) {
-        mapArgs["-datadir"] = dataDir.toStdString();
+        // Pass the data dir to the daemon as UTF-8 bytes so a non-ASCII path
+        // on Windows isn't mangled by the ANSI code page (path::string() does
+        // that). The daemon side uses fs::u8path() to convert back.
+        mapArgs["-datadir"] = pathToUtf8String(qstringToPath(dataDir));
     }
 
     // Ensure the directory exists
     try {
-        fs::create_directories(fs::path(dataDir.toStdString()));
+        fs::create_directories(qstringToPath(dataDir));
     } catch (const fs::filesystem_error &) {
         QMessageBox::critical(0, "Triangles",
             QString("Error: Could not create data directory \"%1\".").arg(dataDir));
@@ -232,7 +262,7 @@ bool IntroDialog::pickDataDirectory()
 
     // Auto-bootstrap: if no blockchain data exists, download automatically.
     // If data exists, offer optional re-download (unless user checked "don't ask again").
-    fs::path dataDirPath(dataDir.toStdString());
+    fs::path dataDirPath = qstringToPath(dataDir);
     bool needsBootstrap = Bootstrap::NeedsBootstrap(dataDirPath);
     bool userWantsBootstrap = false;
     // Captured local-load error from the staged-snapshot probe below, surfaced
@@ -429,21 +459,24 @@ bool IntroDialog::pickDataDirectory()
             QApplication::processEvents();
         };
 
-        // Try the fast UTXO snapshot path first (matches daemon behavior in init.cpp).
-        // The legacy DownloadBootstrap() is hard-disabled in bootstrap.cpp — it always
-        // returns false with "Legacy file-list bootstrap is disabled". Calling it here
-        // would make the GUI wallet unable to bootstrap a fresh install.
+        // Try the fast UTXO snapshot path. The GUI has already probed the data
+        // dir for a staged utxo-snapshot.bin above; if that didn't find one,
+        // DownloadUtxoSnapshot is the canonical HTTPS path to the bootstrap
+        // server. TLS validation is now handled in bootstrap.cpp's StartTLS
+        // via a layered trust store (exedir cacert.pem → SSL_CERT_FILE →
+        // system default paths → embedded ISRG X1 + X2 as belt-and-suspenders),
+        // so this should succeed on Windows GUI builds where the Qt-bundled
+        // libssl-3-x64.dll ships without a default cert path. The system-path
+        // call is trusted on its return value (OpenSSL's hashed-directory
+        // lookups are lazy and would otherwise show 0 eagerly loaded store
+        // objects even on a valid install); the embedded fallbacks are
+        // always attempted as cross-sign resilience and become load-bearing
+        // on a stripped Windows GUI with no cacert.pem and no usable system
+        // CA directory.
         std::string utxoError;
         bool success = Bootstrap::DownloadUtxoSnapshot(host, dataDirPath, progressFn, utxoError);
         if (!success) {
-            // Fall back to legacy bootstrap path (will fail with "disabled" error, but
-            // surfaces the real error if the snapshot path had a different failure).
-            std::string legacyError;
-            if (Bootstrap::DownloadBootstrap(host, dataDirPath, progressFn, legacyError)) {
-                success = true;
-            } else {
-                strError = "UTXO snapshot: " + utxoError + " | Legacy: " + legacyError;
-            }
+            strError = utxoError;
         }
         if (!success) {
             // The TLS-detection strings are matched against the standard error
@@ -509,8 +542,8 @@ bool IntroDialog::migrateDataDirectory(const QString& oldPath, const QString& ne
 {
     namespace fs = std::filesystem;
 
-    fs::path srcDir(oldPath.toStdString());
-    fs::path dstDir(newPath.toStdString());
+    fs::path srcDir = qstringToPath(oldPath);
+    fs::path dstDir = qstringToPath(newPath);
 
     if (!fs::exists(srcDir) || !fs::is_directory(srcDir))
         return false;

src/test/Checkpoints_tests.cpp

@@ -13,9 +13,12 @@ BOOST_AUTO_TEST_CASE(hardened_checkpoints_match_current_chain)
     // Finality pins added 2026-07-01 (the old 2186940 pin was superseded).
     // After the operator rollback to 2,172,037 (cycle-32, 2026-08-06), the
     // 2205000/2206004 pins are no longer in the map (those block heights are
-    // above the new canonical tip and reference non-existent blocks). The new
-    // highest entry is 2172037.
+    // above the rollback tip and reference non-existent blocks). The rebase
+    // base pin (2200899) and the rebase snapshot anchor (2201018, added
+    // 2026-09-06) are the highest entries.
     BOOST_CHECK(Checkpoints::CheckHardened(2172037, uint256("0x52b12f0970191505d9982449875822b78f075d7d76307abed45e7132f5fa2f16")));
+    BOOST_CHECK(Checkpoints::CheckHardened(2200899, uint256("0x28e57e03c7f48df8ef0dedba2b93fd5176500729c955f86546c381be66952e55")));
+    BOOST_CHECK(Checkpoints::CheckHardened(2201018, uint256("0x2a1894007595acaa5d303554253b3c328ebc870f248ffebf83e09a4c8156a78f")));
 }
 
 BOOST_AUTO_TEST_CASE(hardened_checkpoints_reject_wrong_hashes_and_allow_unknown_heights)
@@ -25,10 +28,14 @@ BOOST_AUTO_TEST_CASE(hardened_checkpoints_reject_wrong_hashes_and_allow_unknown_
     BOOST_CHECK(!Checkpoints::CheckHardened(9000, wrongHash));
     BOOST_CHECK(!Checkpoints::CheckHardened(9001, wrongHash));
     BOOST_CHECK(!Checkpoints::CheckHardened(2172037, wrongHash));
+    BOOST_CHECK(!Checkpoints::CheckHardened(2200899, wrongHash));
+    // Negative assertion for the rebase snapshot anchor pin (2026-09-06):
+    // the height is hardened, so a wrong hash must be rejected.
+    BOOST_CHECK(!Checkpoints::CheckHardened(2201018, wrongHash));
 
     // 2186940/2186941 are no longer pinned (superseded by the 2205000+
-    // pins), and after the cycle-32 operator rollback the 2205000+ pins
-    // themselves are gone. Any hash is allowed at those heights.
+    // pins, which were themselves removed in the cycle-32 operator
+    // rollback). Any hash is allowed at those heights.
     BOOST_CHECK(Checkpoints::CheckHardened(2186940, wrongHash));
     BOOST_CHECK(Checkpoints::CheckHardened(2186941, wrongHash));
     BOOST_CHECK(Checkpoints::CheckHardened(2205000, wrongHash));
@@ -38,9 +45,35 @@ BOOST_AUTO_TEST_CASE(hardened_checkpoints_reject_wrong_hashes_and_allow_unknown_
 
 BOOST_AUTO_TEST_CASE(total_blocks_estimate_tracks_latest_hardened_checkpoint)
 {
-    // After operator rollback to 2,172,037, GetTotalBlocksEstimate() returns
-    // 2,172,037 (the new highest compiled checkpoint).
-    BOOST_CHECK_EQUAL(Checkpoints::GetTotalBlocksEstimate(), 2172037);
+    // After operator rollback to 2,172,037, GetTotalBlocksEstimate() returned
+    // 2,172,037. Since the rebase snapshot anchor (2026-09-06), the highest
+    // compiled checkpoint is 2,201,018.
+    BOOST_CHECK_EQUAL(Checkpoints::GetTotalBlocksEstimate(), 2201018);
+}
+
+BOOST_AUTO_TEST_CASE(best_snapshot_is_canonical_rebase_snapshot)
+{
+    // The auto-download path (DownloadUtxoSnapshot) selects whatever
+    // GetBestSnapshotHeight() returns and enforces the compiled (height, sha)
+    // pair from mapSnapshotHashes. Lock both to the canonical rebase snapshot
+    // (2026-09-06) so a retired entry can never be re-selected and a stale or
+    // replayed bootstrap manifest cannot satisfy the gate with an old file.
+    BOOST_CHECK_EQUAL(Checkpoints::GetBestSnapshotHeight(), 2201018);
+    uint256 fileHash;
+    BOOST_CHECK(Checkpoints::GetSnapshotHash(2201018, fileHash));
+    BOOST_CHECK_EQUAL(fileHash.GetHex(),
+                      "ed3fe84ee2388a7083873462af298bd4ba345ceb84e5ac65e3d2906419c0efab");
+    // The retired snapshots must NOT be selectable: the 2172037 rollback-era
+    // snapshot (removed 2026-09-06) and the 2200899 Sep-1 dump (writer/reader
+    // serialization mismatch — unloadable on deployed binaries).
+    BOOST_CHECK(!Checkpoints::GetSnapshotHash(2172037, fileHash));
+    BOOST_CHECK(!Checkpoints::GetSnapshotHash(2200899, fileHash));
+    // Cross-map invariant: the best snapshot height must sit on a hardened
+    // checkpoint whose block hash matches the published snapshot's tip. This
+    // prevents future snapshot/checkpoint drift — the two maps are written
+    // together, and DownloadUtxoSnapshot requires BOTH gates to pass.
+    BOOST_CHECK(Checkpoints::CheckHardened(
+        2201018, uint256("0x2a1894007595acaa5d303554253b3c328ebc870f248ffebf83e09a4c8156a78f")));
 }
 
 BOOST_AUTO_TEST_SUITE_END()

src/test/consensus_safety_tests.cpp

@@ -738,10 +738,11 @@ BOOST_AUTO_TEST_CASE(reorg_guard_offbyone_hardening)
     //      checkpoint height on mainnet. Verified against the actual binary.
     int nCompiled = Checkpoints::GetLastCheckpointHeight();
     BOOST_CHECK(nCompiled > 0);  // sanity: compiled map populated
-    // Must equal the highest key in the compiled map (2172037 as of cycle-33;
-    // this assertion locks the value at the time the binary was built, so
-    // a regression that drops a checkpoint would also fail here).
-    BOOST_CHECK_EQUAL(nCompiled, 2172037);
+    // Must equal the highest key in the compiled map (2201018 since the
+    // 2026-09-06 rebase snapshot anchor; was 2200899 from the 2026-09-02
+    // rebase; this assertion locks the value at the time the binary was
+    // built, so a regression that drops a checkpoint would also fail here).
+    BOOST_CHECK_EQUAL(nCompiled, 2201018);
 }
 
 // ─── Duplicate-guard detection: variable referenced only in allowed files ─

src/utxosnapshot.cpp

@@ -671,6 +671,7 @@ bool LoadSnapshot(const fs::path& snapshotPath,
                 unsigned int nPos = 0;
                 unsigned int nBlocksIndexed = 0;
                 unsigned int nTxsIndexed = 0;
+                unsigned int nVerified = 0;
                 unsigned int nBatchTxs = 0;
                 int64_t nLastReport = GetTimeMillis();
                 while (success && blkdat.good()) {
@@ -698,20 +699,108 @@ bool LoadSnapshot(const fs::path& snapshotPath,
                     }
                     CBlock block;
                     blkdat >> block;
+                    // Stored block position: header start (post magic+size),
+                    // the reader convention. Declared here so both the tx
+                    // loop (CDiskTxPos) and the post-loop readback use the
+                    // SAME stored constant.
+                    const unsigned int nBlockPosStored =
+                        nBlockStart + sizeof(pchMessageStart) + sizeof(unsigned int);
                     // For each tx in the block, record the disk position.
-                    // nTxPos is the offset of the tx *within* the block (after
-                    // magic+size for the first tx, then serialize-size of
-                    // preceding txs). We use the post-serialize offset of each
-                    // tx as nTxPos, matching the convention in ConnectBlock.
-                    unsigned int nTxPos = sizeof(pchMessageStart) + sizeof(unsigned int); // offset of first tx in block
+                    // ConnectBlock (main.cpp) computes the first tx as
+                    // nBlockPos + GetSerializeSize(CBlock())
+                    //   - 2*GetSizeOfCompactSize(0)
+                    //   + GetSizeOfCompactSize(vtx.size())
+                    // where nBlockPos points just AFTER the magic+size prefix
+                    // (i.e. at the 80-byte header). Here nBlockStart points
+                    // AT the magic, so add the 8-byte prefix first:
+                    //   first tx = nBlockStart + 8 + 80 + compactsize(vtx)
+                    // The old code forgot the 80-byte header (started txs at
+                    // +8), shifting every txindex entry 81 bytes low and
+                    // making ReadFromDisk desync — "read txPrev failed" —
+                    // which rejected all post-snapshot PoS blocks and froze
+                    // snapshot-loaded nodes at the snapshot tip.
+                    unsigned int nTxPos = nBlockStart
+                        + sizeof(pchMessageStart) + sizeof(unsigned int)
+                        + ::GetSerializeSize(CBlock(), SER_DISK, CLIENT_VERSION)
+                        - (2 * GetSizeOfCompactSize(0))
+                        + GetSizeOfCompactSize(block.vtx.size());
                     for (const CTransaction& tx : block.vtx) {
-                        CDiskTxPos posThisTx(1, nBlockStart, nTxPos);
+                        // nBlockPos must point at the HEADER (post
+                        // magic+size), the codebase-wide convention:
+                        // CBlock::ReadFromDisk(nFile, nBlockPos) seeks to
+                        // nBlockPos and deserializes the header directly.
+                        // Storing the magic position (8 bytes early) makes
+                        // CheckProofOfStake read a garbage header whose hash
+                        // is absent from mapBlockIndex — the
+                        // "GetKernelStakeModifier() : block not indexed" +
+                        // "check kernel failed" rejection of every
+                        // post-snapshot PoS block.
+                        CDiskTxPos posThisTx(1, nBlockPosStored, nTxPos);
                         txdb.UpdateTxIndex(tx.GetHash(), CTxIndex(posThisTx, tx.vout.size()));
+                        // Fail-closed readback (added after the 2026-09-06
+                        // txpos incidents): for every 4096th tx, immediately
+                        // re-read it at the position we just wrote and prove
+                        // the round-trip. A wrong offset convention here
+                        // previously produced a "successfully loaded" node
+                        // that silently rejected every post-snapshot PoS
+                        // block. Only the in-memory tx is consulted for the
+                        // comparison — a mismatch means our position math or
+                        // blk0001.dat extraction is wrong, and the load fails.
+                        if ((nTxsIndexed % 4096) == 0) {
+                            fseek(blkdat, nTxPos, SEEK_SET);
+                            CTransaction txReadback;
+                            bool fReadOK = true;
+                            try {
+                                blkdat >> txReadback;
+                            } catch (const std::exception&) {
+                                fReadOK = false;
+                            }
+                            if (!fReadOK || txReadback.GetHash() != tx.GetHash()) {
+                                success = false;
+                                strError = "txindex readback verification failed at block "
+                                    + block.GetHash().ToString().substr(0, 16)
+                                    + " tx " + tx.GetHash().ToString().substr(0, 16)
+                                    + " — loader offset bug or corrupt blk0001.dat; "
+                                      "NOT announcing a verified load";
+                                break;
+                            }
+                            nVerified++;
+                        }
                         nTxPos += ::GetSerializeSize(tx, SER_DISK, CLIENT_VERSION);
                         nTxsIndexed++;
                         nBatchTxs++;
                     }
                     nBlocksIndexed++;
+                    // Fail-closed block-level readback (added after the
+                    // 2026-09-06 txpos incidents): starting with the very
+                    // first block, then every 512th, prove the STORED
+                    // position convention by reading through the ACTUAL
+                    // reader path with the position exactly as written into
+                    // the txindex — CBlock::ReadFromDisk(nBlockPosStored,
+                    // false) seeks to that position and deserializes the
+                    // header directly, exactly as CheckProofOfStake does for
+                    // stake inputs. A wrong nBlockPos convention (magic vs
+                    // header) previously produced a "successfully loaded"
+                    // node whose kernel checks all failed; reading an
+                    // independently recomputed position instead of the
+                    // stored one would miss that class of bug, so the stored
+                    // constant itself is the source here.
+                    if (nBlocksIndexed == 1 || (nBlocksIndexed % 512) == 0) {
+                        CBlock blockReadback;
+                        if (!blockReadback.ReadFromDisk(1,
+                                nBlockPosStored,
+                                false)
+                            || blockReadback.GetHash() != block.GetHash()) {
+                            success = false;
+                            strError = "txindex block readback verification failed at "
+                                + block.GetHash().ToString().substr(0, 16)
+                                + " — stored nBlockPos does not honor the "
+                                  "header-at-pos reader convention; NOT "
+                                  "announcing a verified load";
+                            break;
+                        }
+                        nVerified++;
+                    }
                     // Advance past this block to scan the next one
                     nPos = nBlockStart + sizeof(pchMessageStart) + sizeof(unsigned int) + nSize;
                     // Commit batch periodically to avoid unbounded memory
@@ -739,8 +828,9 @@ bool LoadSnapshot(const fs::path& snapshotPath,
                     strError = "Final txindex commit failed";
                 }
                 if (success) {
-                    printf("UtxoSnapshot: built txindex for %u blocks / %u transactions\n",
-                           nBlocksIndexed, nTxsIndexed);
+                    printf("UtxoSnapshot: built txindex for %u blocks / %u transactions "
+                           "(%u readback-verified)\n",
+                           nBlocksIndexed, nTxsIndexed, nVerified);
                 }
             }
         }