Compare commits
5 Commits
| Author | SHA1 | Date | |
|---|---|---|---|
 Krystie
|
f1e92d685f | ||
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Krystie
|
43dade4488 | ||
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Krystie
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f50126a210 | ||
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Krystie
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f9a11fc3a2 | ||
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Krystie
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8181216eb6 |
@@ -37,6 +37,41 @@ if(ENABLE_UNITY_BUILD)
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set(CMAKE_UNITY_BUILD_BATCH_SIZE 8)
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endif()
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|
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# ── Reproducible-build support ─────────────────────────────────────────────
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# REPRODUCIBLE_BUILD=ON strips absolute source paths from the final binary
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# via -ffile-prefix-map. Two builds of the same commit with the same
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# toolchain then produce byte-identical binaries (modulo any source paths
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# that aren't routed through the macro — see scripts/verify-reproducible-build.sh
|
||||
# for the full verification protocol).
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#
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# Default ON: this is a security property we want by default. Disable if
|
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# you need stack traces with absolute paths (e.g. debugging a post-mortem).
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option(REPRODUCIBLE_BUILD "Strip absolute source paths from binaries for reproducibility" ON)
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if(REPRODUCIBLE_BUILD)
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add_compile_options(
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"-ffile-prefix-map=${CMAKE_SOURCE_DIR}=."
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"-ffile-prefix-map=${CMAKE_BINARY_DIR}=."
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)
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||||
# SOURCE_DATE_EPOCH is the canonical reproducible-build env var
|
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# (https://reproducible-builds.org/docs/source-date-epoch/). If the
|
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# user hasn't set it explicitly, fall back to the commit timestamp from
|
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# git. This means binaries built without SOURCE_DATE_EPOCH still embed
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# a deterministic timestamp (the commit time, not wall-clock).
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if(NOT DEFINED ENV{SOURCE_DATE_EPOCH})
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execute_process(
|
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COMMAND git log -n 1 --format=%ct
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WORKING_DIRECTORY "${CMAKE_SOURCE_DIR}"
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OUTPUT_VARIABLE SOURCE_DATE_EPOCH
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OUTPUT_STRIP_TRAILING_WHITESPACE
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ERROR_QUIET
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)
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if(NOT SOURCE_DATE_EPOCH)
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set(SOURCE_DATE_EPOCH "1700000000") # 2023-11-14 fallback
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endif()
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endif()
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message(STATUS "Reproducible build: ON (SOURCE_DATE_EPOCH=${SOURCE_DATE_EPOCH})")
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endif()
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||||
|
||||
# ── Output directories ──
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set(CMAKE_RUNTIME_OUTPUT_DIRECTORY "${CMAKE_BINARY_DIR}/bin")
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set(CMAKE_ARCHIVE_OUTPUT_DIRECTORY "${CMAKE_BINARY_DIR}/lib")
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|
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@@ -0,0 +1,234 @@
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# Triangles Release Process
|
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|
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> Canonical release pipeline for `SamiAhmed7777/triangles_v5`. This document
|
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> is the source of truth for *how* a release is cut. The implementation lives
|
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> in `scripts/verify-reproducible-build.sh` and `scripts/sign-release.sh`.
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||||
|
||||
## Goals
|
||||
|
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1. **Reproducible** — any two builders with the same source tree, same
|
||||
toolchain, and same flags produce byte-identical binaries.
|
||||
2. **Signed** — every release artifact has a detached PGP signature that
|
||||
verifiers can check against a known public key.
|
||||
3. **Verifiable end-to-end** — a third party can confirm a release is
|
||||
legitimate using only `gpg` and `sha256sum`, both installed by default
|
||||
on every Linux distribution.
|
||||
|
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## Pipeline overview
|
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|
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```
|
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source tag (e.g. v6.1.4)
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│
|
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▼
|
||||
┌─────────────────────┐
|
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│ CI builds all 4 │ .github/workflows/build-all.yml
|
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│ targets on each │ (ubuntu / windows / macos)
|
||||
│ platform │
|
||||
└──────────┬───────────┘
|
||||
│ produces: daemon.tar.gz, qt.tar.gz, .deb, .dmg, .exe, ...
|
||||
▼
|
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┌─────────────────────┐
|
||||
│ Local maintainer │ scripts/sign-release.sh <release-dir>
|
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│ signs artifacts │ (uses release signing key in local keyring)
|
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└──────────┬───────────┘
|
||||
│ produces: SHA256SUMS, *.asc detached signatures
|
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▼
|
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┌─────────────────────┐
|
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│ Push to GitHub │ .github/workflows/distribute.yml
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│ release + Docker │ (uploads artifacts, builds Docker image,
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│ + Homebrew tap + │ updates Homebrew formula, submits
|
||||
│ WinGet + Snap │ WinGet + Snap PRs)
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||||
└──────────┬───────────┘
|
||||
│
|
||||
▼
|
||||
┌─────────────────────┐
|
||||
│ Verifier │ scripts/sign-release.sh --verify <dir>
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│ independently │ + gpg --import <release-pubkey>
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||||
│ confirms │
|
||||
└─────────────────────┘
|
||||
```
|
||||
|
||||
## Reproducibility — how it works today
|
||||
|
||||
The Triangles build is already reproducible for Release builds with the
|
||||
following properties:
|
||||
|
||||
| Property | Implementation |
|
||||
|---|---|
|
||||
| `BUILD_DESC` | Git describe output, written to `build.h` at build time |
|
||||
| `BUILD_DATE` | **Commit timestamp** (NOT wall-clock), from `git log -n 1 --format=%ci` |
|
||||
| `__DATE__`/`__TIME__` fallback | Dead code in practice — `build.h` always defines `BUILD_DATE` |
|
||||
| Build paths in binaries | Mapped with `-ffile-prefix-map=${CMAKE_SOURCE_DIR}=.` so absolute source paths do not leak into debug info |
|
||||
|
||||
### Verifying reproducibility
|
||||
|
||||
Run on a clean checkout:
|
||||
|
||||
```bash
|
||||
scripts/verify-reproducible-build.sh
|
||||
```
|
||||
|
||||
This builds `trianglesd` twice into two separate build directories and
|
||||
compares SHA256 hashes. Exits 0 on success.
|
||||
|
||||
Options:
|
||||
- `BUILD_TYPE=Debug scripts/verify-reproducible-build.sh`
|
||||
- `TARGET=triangles-qt scripts/verify-reproducible-build.sh`
|
||||
- `BUILD_DIR_A=/tmp/A BUILD_DIR_B=/tmp/B scripts/verify-reproducible-build.sh`
|
||||
|
||||
## Signing — how it works
|
||||
|
||||
### Generate (or import) a release signing key
|
||||
|
||||
**One-time setup** (the maintainer's machine):
|
||||
|
||||
```bash
|
||||
# Generate a fresh Ed25519 signing subkey under your existing PGP master.
|
||||
# Ed25519 is preferred over RSA-4096: smaller signatures, faster, quantum-resistant
|
||||
# at the security level we need for code-signing.
|
||||
gpg --quick-generate-key 'Sami Ahmed <sami@cryptographic-triangles.org>' ed25519 sign never
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||||
|
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# Print the public key block to publish on the website / GitHub.
|
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gpg --armor --export 'sami@cryptographic-triangles.org' > release-pubkey.asc
|
||||
|
||||
# Export your secret key BACKUP. Store this on airgapped / offline media.
|
||||
# Without this backup, lost local keyring = lost ability to sign new releases.
|
||||
gpg --export-secret-keys 'sami@cryptographic-triangles.org' > release-seckey-BACKUP.asc
|
||||
chmod 600 release-seckey-BACKUP.asc
|
||||
```
|
||||
|
||||
**Import an existing key** (e.g. on a new maintainer machine):
|
||||
|
||||
```bash
|
||||
gpg --import release-seckey-BACKUP.asc
|
||||
```
|
||||
|
||||
### Sign a release directory
|
||||
|
||||
After CI has produced the artifacts in a known directory:
|
||||
|
||||
```bash
|
||||
scripts/sign-release.sh /path/to/release-dir
|
||||
```
|
||||
|
||||
This will:
|
||||
1. Generate `SHA256SUMS` for every release artifact (.tar.gz, .deb, .dmg,
|
||||
.exe, .zip, .AppImage)
|
||||
2. Write a detached PGP signature (`<artifact>.asc`) for each artifact
|
||||
3. Write a detached PGP signature over `SHA256SUMS` itself
|
||||
4. Refuse to run if the signing key isn't in the local keyring (safety)
|
||||
|
||||
### Verify a release
|
||||
|
||||
A third party (user, exchange, package maintainer) verifies with:
|
||||
|
||||
```bash
|
||||
# 1. Import the public key (one-time).
|
||||
gpg --import release-pubkey.asc
|
||||
|
||||
# 2. Verify everything in the release directory.
|
||||
scripts/sign-release.sh --verify /path/to/release-dir
|
||||
```
|
||||
|
||||
This checks:
|
||||
- `SHA256SUMS.asc` against `SHA256SUMS` (the master signature)
|
||||
- Each `<artifact>.asc` against its `<artifact>` (belt-and-suspenders)
|
||||
- Each artifact's SHA256 against `SHA256SUMS` (integrity)
|
||||
|
||||
## Why both per-artifact signatures AND a SHA256SUMS signature?
|
||||
|
||||
- **SHA256SUMS + signature**: small, fast to verify, single point of trust.
|
||||
If the SHA256SUMS.asc checks out and a file's SHA256 matches an entry,
|
||||
you're done — you trust that entry.
|
||||
- **Per-artifact signatures**: defense against a hypothetical attack where
|
||||
someone modifies `SHA256SUMS` but not the artifacts (or vice versa).
|
||||
Two independent signature chains.
|
||||
|
||||
For most verifiers, checking `SHA256SUMS.asc` + `sha256sum -c SHA256SUMS`
|
||||
is sufficient. The per-artifact .asc files are insurance.
|
||||
|
||||
## CI integration
|
||||
|
||||
`.github/workflows/build-all.yml` already produces the artifacts. The
|
||||
remaining work (separate PR) is to add a "sign" job that runs
|
||||
`scripts/sign-release.sh` against the assembled release directory using a
|
||||
key stored as a GitHub Actions secret.
|
||||
|
||||
**Required secrets (one-time setup in repo Settings → Secrets):**
|
||||
- `GPG_PRIVATE_KEY` — base64-encoded `release-seckey-BACKUP.asc`
|
||||
(see [GitHub docs on encrypted secrets](https://docs.github.com/en/actions/security-guides/encrypted-secrets))
|
||||
- `GPG_PASSPHRASE` — passphrase for the signing key (if any)
|
||||
- `GITHUB_TOKEN` — already provided by Actions
|
||||
|
||||
**Suggested job sketch** (in `.github/workflows/build-all.yml` after all
|
||||
build jobs complete):
|
||||
|
||||
```yaml
|
||||
sign:
|
||||
name: Sign release artifacts
|
||||
needs: [build-linux-daemon, build-linux-qt, build-windows-daemon, build-windows-qt, build-macos]
|
||||
runs-on: ubuntu-22.04
|
||||
if: startsWith(github.ref, 'refs/tags/v')
|
||||
steps:
|
||||
- uses: actions/checkout@v4
|
||||
|
||||
- name: Import signing key
|
||||
run: |
|
||||
echo "${{ secrets.GPG_PRIVATE_KEY }}" | base64 -d | gpg --import
|
||||
|
||||
- name: Sign artifacts
|
||||
run: scripts/sign-release.sh release-artifacts/
|
||||
env:
|
||||
GPG_PASSPHRASE: ${{ secrets.GPG_PASSPHRASE }}
|
||||
```
|
||||
|
||||
## Public key distribution
|
||||
|
||||
The release public key MUST be published in **at least three independent
|
||||
places** so a keyserver takedown or DNS hijack cannot prevent verification:
|
||||
|
||||
1. **This repository** — `release-pubkey.asc` at the repo root, committed
|
||||
on every release tag.
|
||||
2. **The website** — `https://cryptographic-triangles.org/release-pubkey.asc`
|
||||
3. **Public keyservers** — submit to `keys.openpgp.org`, `keyserver.ubuntu.com`,
|
||||
`pgp.mit.edu`. Each is independently operated.
|
||||
|
||||
Distribution list refreshed with every key rotation (rare; treat as
|
||||
multi-year commitment).
|
||||
|
||||
## Failure modes & recovery
|
||||
|
||||
| Scenario | Recovery |
|
||||
|---|---|
|
||||
| Signing key compromised | Revoke via pre-published revocation certificate. Re-cut release. Document incident. |
|
||||
| Signing key lost (no backup) | Cannot sign new releases. Existing artifacts still verify against the published public key. Treat as catastrophic; re-mint a new key and treat the chain as fork-vulnerable until community updates. |
|
||||
| Public key not yet distributed | User gets `gpg: Can't check signature: No public key`. Provide clear "first verify the key fingerprint out-of-band" instructions on the website. |
|
||||
| CI secret leaked | Rotate the signing key immediately; treat all artifacts signed with the old key as suspect. |
|
||||
| `SHA256SUMS` signed but artifacts don't match | `sha256sum -c` fails. Either an artifact was corrupted in transit, or someone tampered. Re-download from GitHub and re-verify. |
|
||||
|
||||
## Checklist for cutting a release
|
||||
|
||||
- [ ] Source tree is clean (no uncommitted changes)
|
||||
- [ ] `scripts/verify-reproducible-build.sh` passes (builds are reproducible)
|
||||
- [ ] All CI jobs on the release tag are green
|
||||
- [ ] Release artifacts are in a single directory (`release-artifacts/`)
|
||||
- [ ] `scripts/sign-release.sh release-artifacts/` runs without error
|
||||
- [ ] `scripts/sign-release.sh --verify release-artifacts/` passes
|
||||
- [ ] `release-pubkey.asc` is current and committed to the repo
|
||||
- [ ] GitHub release created with all artifacts + SHA256SUMS + SHA256SUMS.asc
|
||||
- [ ] `distribute.yml` workflow ran (Docker Hub, Homebrew, WinGet, Snap)
|
||||
- [ ] Announcement posted (Twitter/Mastodon, Discord/Telegram, mailing list if any)
|
||||
|
||||
## Future work
|
||||
|
||||
- **Reproducibility hardening**: add `-ffile-prefix-map` to compile flags so
|
||||
absolute source paths don't leak into the binary (would also fix the
|
||||
simd.c:265 UBSan build-id drift).
|
||||
- **Gitian-style deterministic builds**: containerized build environment
|
||||
pinned to a specific GCC/binutils version, so multiple independent
|
||||
verifiers can rebuild from source and get identical hashes.
|
||||
- **Transparency log**: publish each release artifact hash to a Sigstore /
|
||||
sigsum / Certificate Transparency-style log so any tampering is publicly
|
||||
auditable.
|
||||
- **Key rotation policy**: document how/when the signing key gets rotated
|
||||
(probably never, but state the policy).
|
||||
+123
-1
@@ -421,4 +421,126 @@ wrong; fixed to flip a low-order byte.
|
||||
|
||||
Still-uncovered (future sessions, in rough priority): keystore, kernel
|
||||
(stake modifier / PoS kernel), pbkdf2 + scrypt (both have public KAT
|
||||
vectors), addrman, protocol, smessage.
|
||||
(vectors), addrman, protocol, smessage.
|
||||
|
||||
## 2026-07-06 -- Krystie (this session)
|
||||
|
||||
### Hermes's 2026-07-04 handoff letter: corrected
|
||||
|
||||
The handoff letter (notes/hermes-handoff-2026-07-04.md) said H4/W1/W2 were "uncommitted on DNS2, ready to land once W2 is fixed." That was incorrect: W2/H4/W1 were committed on 2026-07-02 by Krystie as 6cadf7f ("chaindb: W2 iterator-scoping + H4 marker-verify + W1 INADDR_ANY"), tagged v6.1.3 and v6.1.4, and reachable from both master and audit/sync-fast-assumevalid. Verified: git log shows the commit on those branches; the working tree has the W2 iterator scope comment ("W2 root cause: this iterator MUST be destroyed before source.Close()") and the H4 marker-verify block at chaindb_migrate.cpp:210-251.
|
||||
|
||||
So the "blocked on W2" framing in the handoff letter was stale by the time it was written. W2 has been runtime-verified against the full DNS2 2.2M-block chain (per the 6cadf7f commit message).
|
||||
|
||||
### Action taken this session: DoS_checkSig timing fix (PR #14, commit b79e2b8)
|
||||
|
||||
The previous timing assertion in DoS_tests.cpp compared `nManyValidate < nOneValidate` -- loops with different op counts (100 signs vs 500 verifies), never meaningful. The downgrade to BOOST_WARN_MESSAGE that was on the branch fires every run because the signature cache is intentionally a no-op on master.
|
||||
|
||||
Replaced with: warmup pass, 3 timed trials of 500 verifies each, take the min, assert <600ms. Threshold calibrated to ~1.6x observed p100 on this DNS2 dev box (~380ms real perf in debug builds).
|
||||
|
||||
Verification: 5 consecutive runs all pass with min in [361, 411]ms; full unit suite 227/227 cases, 21597/21597 assertions, 0 warnings.
|
||||
|
||||
What this catches that the WARN missed: an actual verify-path regression (accidental O(n) cache key, double-verify, hooking up OpenSSL instead of libsecp256k1) would roughly double the verify time and trip the 600ms check. Ordinary CI variance does not.
|
||||
|
||||
### PR #14 status as of 2026-07-06
|
||||
|
||||
- Mergeable: MERGEABLE (UNSTABLE because CI is in progress)
|
||||
- 9 CI jobs running: linux/win/macos builds + lint + sanitizers + unit. Started 2026-07-07T05:56:39Z, ~5 min before this log.
|
||||
- New commit on top of branch tip: b79e2b8 (DoS_checkSig timing)
|
||||
- Branch tip before my commit: ded9073
|
||||
- Pushed to origin (GitHub) + gitea + gitsami (PC mirror)
|
||||
|
||||
### Next: kernel / PoS coverage
|
||||
|
||||
The audit's flagged remaining uncovered security-critical module is kernel (stake modifier / PoS kernel hash). After PR #14 merges or is acknowledged, start kernel tests in a new branch off master. Will cross-check the kernel algorithm against Z.Ai glm-4.6 before writing the tests.
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
## 2026-07-06 -- Krystie (continued)
|
||||
|
||||
### Action taken: V5 soft-cap kernel coverage (branch audit/kernel-coverage, commit ab0f4b4)
|
||||
|
||||
The GetWeight function has a critical 2026-04-20 deploy change (7-day soft cap, gated on height + activation timestamp) that was completely uncovered. Existing staking_tests only covered the pre-V5 path and one negative test for the soft-cap-doesn't-apply-pre-V5 case.
|
||||
|
||||
Added 8 test cases covering all three regimes of the conditional:
|
||||
- V5+post-activation (the actual production path since 2026-04-20): cap at 7 days, linear below cap, exact-at-cap, 1s-past-cap, min-age-floor
|
||||
- V5+pre-activation: UNcapped (historical stakes preserve original rules)
|
||||
- V5+activation-exact: >= boundary semantics
|
||||
- V5+high-height (2.5M like DNS2 live): cap unchanged by distance from fork
|
||||
|
||||
Used RAII (BestChainGuard struct) to scope pindexBest swaps. Existing consensus_safety_tests use a manual save/restore pattern that leaks the stack pointer into the global if a CHECK throws -- strictly worse than the RAII pattern.
|
||||
|
||||
Full suite: 235/235 cases, 21617/21617 assertions. ctest: 4/4 green.
|
||||
|
||||
New branch: audit/kernel-coverage pushed to origin + gitea.
|
||||
|
||||
### PR #14 CI status update
|
||||
8 of 9 CI jobs in progress as of session end (linux-unit, linux-sanitizers, build-linux-{daemon,qt}, build-macos, build-windows-{daemon,qt}, clang-tidy-diff still running; clang-format-diff already passed in 19s).
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
## 2026-07-06 -- Krystie (final session status)
|
||||
|
||||
### PR #14 final CI status (28845154775 on 8181216e)
|
||||
- test-linux-unit: PASS
|
||||
- test-linux-sanitizers: FAIL (pre-existing, see below)
|
||||
- build-linux-daemon/qt, build-windows-daemon/qt, build-macos: pending/completed
|
||||
- clang-format-diff: PASS
|
||||
- clang-tidy-diff: PASS
|
||||
|
||||
The sanitizer failure is PRE-EXISTING and not caused by my changes:
|
||||
- Same `simd.c:265 left shift of negative value -52` error appears in the
|
||||
sanitizer log for the PRIOR commit b79e2b82 (before my notes log update),
|
||||
AND for the current 8181216e.
|
||||
- The build-all.yml workflow has `continue-on-error: true` on the
|
||||
sanitizer job with the comment: "Once the test suite is clean under
|
||||
sanitizers, drop continue-on-error." This indicates the simd.c issue
|
||||
has been a known latent bug for some time.
|
||||
- The failure is in vendored SIMD crypto primitive (fft64 / compress_big /
|
||||
finalize_big in src/simd.c), called from Hash9 -> CBlock::GetHash ->
|
||||
CBlock::print() during TestingSetup setup, BEFORE any test case runs
|
||||
(including the ones I added).
|
||||
- Not a fix-for-this-session candidate: it's a crypto primitive change
|
||||
that needs careful review to avoid breaking consensus-affecting hashing.
|
||||
Logged here as a separate workstream for a future session.
|
||||
|
||||
PR #14 is ready to merge from a test-correctness perspective. The sanitizer
|
||||
failure is allowed by the workflow and does not block merge.
|
||||
|
||||
### Summary of session deliverables
|
||||
1. PR #14 commit b79e2b8: replaced broken DoS_checkSig cache-timing WARN
|
||||
with a stable per-verify bound (227/227 -> 235/235 unit tests, all
|
||||
green).
|
||||
2. PR #14 commit 8181216: notes/audit-progress.md session log update.
|
||||
3. New branch audit/kernel-coverage commit ab0f4b4: 8 new GetWeight V5
|
||||
soft-cap tests covering all three regimes of the height+timestamp gate
|
||||
(pre-V5 hard cap, V5+pre-activation uncapped, V5+post-activation 7-day
|
||||
cap). Uses RAII for safe pindexBest scoping. Pushed to origin + gitea.
|
||||
|
||||
### Outstanding work for future sessions (in rough priority)
|
||||
1. simd.c:265 UBSan fix (latent pre-existing bug, separate careful PR)
|
||||
2. chaindb_equivalence (leveldb vs rocksdb byte-level diff test)
|
||||
3. keystore test coverage (security-critical)
|
||||
4. pbkdf2 + scrypt KAT vector tests
|
||||
5. net_bootstrap peer-selection paths
|
||||
6. PR #13 wallet brand color alignment (UI-only, low risk)
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
## 2026-07-06 -- Krystie (continued 2)
|
||||
|
||||
### Action taken: keystore coverage (branch audit/keystore-coverage, commit 06853d4)
|
||||
|
||||
The keystore layer guards every spendable key in the wallet. Audit flagged it as security-critical with zero coverage. CCrypter is covered separately; this suite focuses on CBasicKeyStore + CCryptoKeyStore map operations, lock/unlock state machine, and encrypt/decrypt round-trips.
|
||||
|
||||
27 cases covering:
|
||||
- CBasicKeyStore: add/have/get roundtrips, missing-key negatives, pubkey derivation, secret compressed-flag preservation, GetKeys enumeration + input-clearing, CScript storage (BIP-0013) roundtrips and idempotency
|
||||
- CCryptoKeyStore: state machine (initial state, LockKeyStore flip, refuse-to-Lock-when-plaintext-keys-exist), encrypt/decrypt roundtrip with the documented EncryptKeys -> Unlock sequence, wrong-master rejection, AddKey-when-locked refusal, AddKey-when-crypted-and-unlocked actually encrypts, crypted-mode HaveKey/GetKeys/GetPubKey paths, edge cases (empty Unlock, double Unlock)
|
||||
|
||||
Used TestableCryptoKeyStore (unit-test-only subclass widening protected access via using-declarations) so the test can drive the protected paths without modifying production code.
|
||||
|
||||
Subtle findings while writing the tests:
|
||||
- `Unlock()` refuses when mapKeys is non-empty (SetCrypted precondition) -- must use `EncryptKeys` to migrate plaintext -> encrypted first
|
||||
- `EncryptKeys` sets fUseCrypto=true but does NOT set vMasterKey; subsequent `Unlock(master)` is required to install the key
|
||||
- `AddKey` when crypted+unlocked ENCRYPTS the new key (good); when crypted+locked refuses (good); when crypted+unlocked and AddKey is called then Lock+Unlock, the encrypted key round-trips correctly
|
||||
|
||||
Full suite: 262/262 cases, 21713/21713 assertions. ctest: 4/4 green. Branch pushed to origin + gitea.
|
||||
|
||||
### PR #14 CI: ALL REAL JOBS GREEN
|
||||
Final CI run (run 28845879030 on f9a11fc) — every required job passes except the pre-existing simd.c sanitizer failure. PR #14 is merge-ready.
|
||||
|
||||
+29
-22
@@ -1,29 +1,36 @@
|
||||
# Version Bump Script
|
||||
# Scripts
|
||||
|
||||
Updates the version number across all files in the repo from a single command.
|
||||
Operational scripts for the Triangles project. See also `doc/release-process.md`
|
||||
for the canonical release pipeline documentation.
|
||||
|
||||
## Usage
|
||||
## Build verification
|
||||
|
||||
**Set a specific version:**
|
||||
```bash
|
||||
bash scripts/bump-version.sh 5.7.0
|
||||
```
|
||||
- **`verify-reproducible-build.sh`** — builds the daemon (or another target)
|
||||
twice from the same source tree and verifies the SHA256 hashes match.
|
||||
Catches accidental introduction of non-determinism (e.g. `__DATE__`/`__TIME__`
|
||||
regressions, dirty git state, PIE base-address drift).
|
||||
|
||||
**Or edit `src/clientversion.h` first, then sync everything else:**
|
||||
```bash
|
||||
bash scripts/bump-version.sh
|
||||
```
|
||||
## Release signing
|
||||
|
||||
## What it updates
|
||||
- **`sign-release.sh`** — generates `SHA256SUMS`, writes detached PGP
|
||||
signatures (`.asc`) over each release artifact and over `SHA256SUMS`.
|
||||
Supports `--verify` for independent third-party verification.
|
||||
Uses `TRIANGLES_RELEASE_KEY` env var (defaults to
|
||||
`sami@cryptographic-triangles.org`).
|
||||
|
||||
- `src/clientversion.h` (source of truth)
|
||||
- `src/version.h`
|
||||
- `triangles-qt.pro`
|
||||
- `Dockerfile`
|
||||
- All packaging manifests (Docker, Snap, Scoop, WinGet, RPM, Flatpak, Debian, AppImage)
|
||||
## Existing infrastructure
|
||||
|
||||
## What still needs manual review after running
|
||||
|
||||
- `packaging/appstream/...metainfo.xml` — add a new `<release>` entry
|
||||
- `README.md` — update header version if desired
|
||||
- Any documentation with download URLs
|
||||
- **`bump-version.sh`** — sync version numbers across all manifests from
|
||||
`src/clientversion.h`.
|
||||
- **`sign-snapshot.sh`** — sign a UTXO snapshot file with the wallet's
|
||||
signing address (not a PGP key; this is a chain-level signature, not a
|
||||
release signature).
|
||||
- **`validate_onion_seeds.py`** — validate every `.onion` address in
|
||||
`triangles.conf` against the v3 hidden-service checksum.
|
||||
- **`ibd-smoke-test.sh`** — fresh-datadir IBD smoke test for catching the
|
||||
classic "stalls early / loops around 570" failure mode.
|
||||
- **`ci/build-rocksdb.sh`** — build and install a pinned RocksDB version
|
||||
for CI.
|
||||
- **`ci/package-linux-daemon.sh`** — Linux packaging step (.deb).
|
||||
- **`ci/package-windows-daemon.sh`** — Windows packaging step.
|
||||
- **`tri/`** — operator-facing CLI for node administration.
|
||||
|
||||
Executable
+222
@@ -0,0 +1,222 @@
|
||||
#!/usr/bin/env bash
|
||||
# sign-release.sh
|
||||
#
|
||||
# Sign Triangles release artifacts (the binaries/.debs/.dmgs/.exes built
|
||||
# by the GitHub Actions release pipeline) with a long-term PGP key, and
|
||||
# write SHA256SUMS + detached .asc signatures alongside each artifact.
|
||||
#
|
||||
# Usage:
|
||||
# scripts/sign-release.sh /path/to/release-dir
|
||||
# scripts/sign-release.sh /path/to/release-dir --key 0xDEADBEEF
|
||||
# scripts/sign-release.sh --verify /path/to/release-dir
|
||||
#
|
||||
# Inputs (in the release directory):
|
||||
# - *.tar.gz, *.deb, *.dmg, *.exe, *.zip, *.AppImage (any release artifact)
|
||||
# - SHA256SUMS file (if present, re-signed; if absent, generated)
|
||||
#
|
||||
# Outputs (written next to each artifact):
|
||||
# - <artifact>.asc - detached PGP signature (binary or clearsigned)
|
||||
# - SHA256SUMS - canonical checksum list (overwrites any existing)
|
||||
# - SHA256SUMS.asc - detached PGP signature over SHA256SUMS
|
||||
#
|
||||
# Verification mode (--verify):
|
||||
# For each *.asc, runs `gpg --verify` against the artifact.
|
||||
# Then runs `sha256sum -c SHA256SUMS` if present.
|
||||
# Exits 0 if all artifacts verify; non-zero on any failure.
|
||||
#
|
||||
# Requirements:
|
||||
# - gpg2 or gpg on PATH
|
||||
# - Signing key already in the local keyring (or use --key to select)
|
||||
# - For verification: the signer's public key must be importable
|
||||
# (either already in the keyring, or fetched from a keyserver)
|
||||
|
||||
set -euo pipefail
|
||||
|
||||
SCRIPT_DIR="$(cd "$(dirname "${BASH_SOURCE[0]}")" && pwd)"
|
||||
DEFAULT_KEY="${TRIANGLES_RELEASE_KEY:-sami@cryptographic-triangles.org}"
|
||||
|
||||
usage() {
|
||||
sed -n '2,30p' "$0"
|
||||
exit "${1:-1}"
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
# ── Parse args ─────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────
|
||||
MODE="sign"
|
||||
RELEASE_DIR=""
|
||||
SIGN_KEY="$DEFAULT_KEY"
|
||||
|
||||
while [ $# -gt 0 ]; do
|
||||
case "$1" in
|
||||
--verify)
|
||||
MODE="verify"
|
||||
shift
|
||||
;;
|
||||
--key)
|
||||
SIGN_KEY="$2"
|
||||
shift 2
|
||||
;;
|
||||
-h|--help)
|
||||
usage 0
|
||||
;;
|
||||
*)
|
||||
RELEASE_DIR="$1"
|
||||
shift
|
||||
;;
|
||||
esac
|
||||
done
|
||||
|
||||
if [ -z "$RELEASE_DIR" ]; then
|
||||
echo "ERROR: release directory required" >&2
|
||||
usage 2
|
||||
fi
|
||||
|
||||
if [ ! -d "$RELEASE_DIR" ]; then
|
||||
echo "ERROR: not a directory: $RELEASE_DIR" >&2
|
||||
exit 2
|
||||
fi
|
||||
|
||||
cd "$RELEASE_DIR"
|
||||
|
||||
# ── Sign mode ──────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────
|
||||
if [ "$MODE" = "sign" ]; then
|
||||
command -v gpg >/dev/null || { echo "ERROR: gpg not found" >&2; exit 3; }
|
||||
|
||||
# Verify the signing key actually exists in the keyring (don't want to
|
||||
# silently create a new key with the same email).
|
||||
if ! gpg --list-secret-keys "$SIGN_KEY" >/dev/null 2>&1; then
|
||||
echo "ERROR: signing key '$SIGN_KEY' not found in local keyring" >&2
|
||||
echo " import it first: gpg --import <keyfile>" >&2
|
||||
exit 3
|
||||
fi
|
||||
|
||||
echo "Signing artifacts in $RELEASE_DIR with key $SIGN_KEY..."
|
||||
|
||||
# Generate (or regenerate) SHA256SUMS for every release artifact in the dir.
|
||||
# Recognized extensions: .tar.gz, .deb, .dmg, .exe, .zip, .AppImage, .dmg.blockmap
|
||||
# Excludes: .asc files, SHA256SUMS itself, README/notes text files.
|
||||
ARTIFACTS=()
|
||||
while IFS= read -r -d '' f; do
|
||||
case "$f" in
|
||||
*.asc|SHA256SUMS|SHA256SUMS.asc|*.txt|*.md) continue ;;
|
||||
esac
|
||||
ARTIFACTS+=("$f")
|
||||
done < <(find . -maxdepth 1 -type f -print0 | sort -z)
|
||||
|
||||
if [ ${#ARTIFACTS[@]} -eq 0 ]; then
|
||||
echo "ERROR: no release artifacts found in $RELEASE_DIR" >&2
|
||||
echo " expected: .tar.gz, .deb, .dmg, .exe, .zip, .AppImage" >&2
|
||||
exit 4
|
||||
fi
|
||||
|
||||
echo " Found ${#ARTIFACTS[@]} artifact(s):"
|
||||
for a in "${ARTIFACTS[@]}"; do echo " - $a"; done
|
||||
echo ""
|
||||
|
||||
# Regenerate SHA256SUMS from scratch (deterministic sort).
|
||||
: > SHA256SUMS
|
||||
for a in "${ARTIFACTS[@]}"; do
|
||||
sha256sum "$a" >> SHA256SUMS
|
||||
done
|
||||
echo "✓ Wrote SHA256SUMS"
|
||||
|
||||
# Detached signature over each artifact.
|
||||
for a in "${ARTIFACTS[@]}"; do
|
||||
rm -f "${a}.asc"
|
||||
if gpg --batch --yes \
|
||||
--local-user "$SIGN_KEY" \
|
||||
--armor --detach-sign \
|
||||
--output "${a}.asc" \
|
||||
"$a" 2>/dev/null; then
|
||||
echo "✓ Signed ${a}"
|
||||
else
|
||||
echo "✗ Failed to sign ${a}" >&2
|
||||
exit 5
|
||||
fi
|
||||
done
|
||||
|
||||
# Detached signature over SHA256SUMS (this is what verifiers actually check
|
||||
# first; individual .asc files are belt-and-suspenders).
|
||||
rm -f SHA256SUMS.asc
|
||||
if gpg --batch --yes \
|
||||
--local-user "$SIGN_KEY" \
|
||||
--armor --detach-sign \
|
||||
--output SHA256SUMS.asc \
|
||||
SHA256SUMS 2>/dev/null; then
|
||||
echo "✓ Signed SHA256SUMS"
|
||||
else
|
||||
echo "✗ Failed to sign SHA256SUMS" >&2
|
||||
exit 5
|
||||
fi
|
||||
|
||||
echo ""
|
||||
echo "Done. To verify from this directory:"
|
||||
echo " gpg --verify SHA256SUMS.asc SHA256SUMS"
|
||||
echo " sha256sum -c SHA256SUMS"
|
||||
echo ""
|
||||
echo "Or run: $0 --verify $RELEASE_DIR"
|
||||
exit 0
|
||||
fi
|
||||
|
||||
# ── Verify mode ───────────────────────────────────────────────────────────
|
||||
if [ "$MODE" = "verify" ]; then
|
||||
command -v gpg >/dev/null || { echo "ERROR: gpg not found" >&2; exit 3; }
|
||||
|
||||
FAILED=0
|
||||
|
||||
echo "Verifying signatures in $RELEASE_DIR..."
|
||||
echo ""
|
||||
|
||||
# Verify SHA256SUMS.asc if present (this is the master signature).
|
||||
if [ -f SHA256SUMS ] && [ -f SHA256SUMS.asc ]; then
|
||||
if gpg --verify SHA256SUMS.asc SHA256SUMS 2>/dev/null; then
|
||||
echo "✓ SHA256SUMS signature: VALID ($(gpg --list-packets < SHA256SUMS.asc 2>/dev/null | grep -oP 'keyid \K[A-F0-9]+' | head -1 || echo unknown))"
|
||||
else
|
||||
echo "✗ SHA256SUMS signature: INVALID"
|
||||
FAILED=$((FAILED + 1))
|
||||
fi
|
||||
else
|
||||
echo "(no SHA256SUMS / SHA256SUMS.asc; skipping master signature)"
|
||||
fi
|
||||
|
||||
# Verify each artifact's individual signature.
|
||||
while IFS= read -r -d '' asc; do
|
||||
artifact="${asc%.asc}"
|
||||
if [ ! -f "$artifact" ]; then
|
||||
echo "✗ $asc: artifact missing ($artifact)"
|
||||
FAILED=$((FAILED + 1))
|
||||
continue
|
||||
fi
|
||||
if gpg --verify "$asc" "$artifact" 2>/dev/null; then
|
||||
echo "✓ $artifact signature: VALID"
|
||||
else
|
||||
echo "✗ $artifact signature: INVALID"
|
||||
FAILED=$((FAILED + 1))
|
||||
fi
|
||||
done < <(find . -maxdepth 1 -name "*.asc" -not -name "SHA256SUMS.asc" -print0 | sort -z)
|
||||
|
||||
# Verify checksums.
|
||||
if [ -f SHA256SUMS ]; then
|
||||
echo ""
|
||||
echo "Verifying checksums..."
|
||||
if sha256sum -c SHA256SUMS 2>&1 | tail -n +3; then
|
||||
: # sha256sum -c outputs per-file status; aggregate below
|
||||
fi
|
||||
# Count any "FAILED" lines from sha256sum -c output.
|
||||
CHECKSUM_FAILS="$(sha256sum -c SHA256SUMS 2>&1 | grep -c ': FAILED' || true)"
|
||||
if [ "$CHECKSUM_FAILS" -gt 0 ]; then
|
||||
echo "✗ $CHECKSUM_FAILS checksum(s) FAILED"
|
||||
FAILED=$((FAILED + CHECKSUM_FAILS))
|
||||
else
|
||||
echo "✓ All checksums match SHA256SUMS"
|
||||
fi
|
||||
fi
|
||||
|
||||
echo ""
|
||||
if [ "$FAILED" -eq 0 ]; then
|
||||
echo "✓ ALL VERIFICATIONS PASSED"
|
||||
exit 0
|
||||
else
|
||||
echo "✗ $FAILED VERIFICATION(S) FAILED"
|
||||
exit 1
|
||||
fi
|
||||
fi
|
||||
Executable
+130
@@ -0,0 +1,130 @@
|
||||
#!/usr/bin/env bash
|
||||
# verify-reproducible-build.sh
|
||||
#
|
||||
# Builds the Triangles daemon (trianglesd) twice from the same source tree
|
||||
# into two separate build directories, then compares the resulting
|
||||
# SHA256 hashes. Exits 0 if the two builds produce byte-identical binaries,
|
||||
# non-zero otherwise.
|
||||
#
|
||||
# Usage:
|
||||
# scripts/verify-reproducible-build.sh # default: trianglesd, Release
|
||||
# BUILD_TYPE=Debug scripts/verify-reproducible-build.sh # override build type
|
||||
# TARGET=triangles-qt scripts/verify-reproducible-build.sh # build Qt wallet instead
|
||||
#
|
||||
# What "reproducible" means here:
|
||||
# Given identical source tree, identical compiler toolchain, identical
|
||||
# build flags, identical SOURCE_DATE_EPOCH (if set) -- the resulting
|
||||
# binary must hash identically across separate build directories.
|
||||
#
|
||||
# This script does NOT enforce compiler version pinning. Two different
|
||||
# GCC versions will legitimately produce different binaries even with
|
||||
# identical flags. The verification is "same source + same toolchain =
|
||||
# same binary."
|
||||
#
|
||||
# Pass criteria:
|
||||
# 1. Both builds succeed
|
||||
# 2. Both binaries exist
|
||||
# 3. SHA256 of the two binaries is equal
|
||||
#
|
||||
# On failure: prints the two SHA256s and the diff in size so a reviewer
|
||||
# can investigate. Common causes of non-determinism:
|
||||
# - __DATE__/__TIME__ embedded (we eliminate this in CMakeLists.txt)
|
||||
# - absolute paths in __FILE__ (mitigated by -ffile-prefix-map)
|
||||
# - uninitialized stack/heap contents (should not affect final binary)
|
||||
# - linker adds random base addresses (PIE; deterministic if compiled
|
||||
# with -fno-pie)
|
||||
|
||||
set -euo pipefail
|
||||
|
||||
# ── Config ─────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────
|
||||
SCRIPT_DIR="$(cd "$(dirname "${BASH_SOURCE[0]}")" && pwd)"
|
||||
SOURCE_DIR="${SOURCE_DIR:-$(cd "$SCRIPT_DIR/.." && pwd)}"
|
||||
BUILD_TYPE="${BUILD_TYPE:-Release}"
|
||||
TARGET="${TARGET:-trianglesd}"
|
||||
# Skip Qt by default -- it's slow and adds CI noise. Override with TARGET=triangles-qt
|
||||
: "${BUILD_QT:=OFF}"
|
||||
BUILD_DIR_A="${BUILD_DIR_A:-/tmp/triangles-repro-A}"
|
||||
BUILD_DIR_B="${BUILD_DIR_B:-/tmp/triangles-repro-B}"
|
||||
LOG_A="${LOG_A:-/tmp/triangles-repro-A.log}"
|
||||
LOG_B="${LOG_B:-/tmp/triangles-repro-B.log}"
|
||||
|
||||
# ── Preflight ──────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────
|
||||
command -v cmake >/dev/null || { echo "ERROR: cmake not found" >&2; exit 2; }
|
||||
command -v ninja >/dev/null || { echo "ERROR: ninja not found (apt install ninja-build)" >&2; exit 2; }
|
||||
command -v sha256sum >/dev/null || { echo "ERROR: sha256sum not found" >&2; exit 2; }
|
||||
|
||||
if [ ! -d "$SOURCE_DIR" ]; then
|
||||
echo "ERROR: source dir not found: $SOURCE_DIR" >&2
|
||||
exit 2
|
||||
fi
|
||||
|
||||
# Refuse to run if the working tree is dirty -- dirty tree = non-deterministic
|
||||
# git describe output = non-deterministic binary. Run on a clean checkout
|
||||
# or a release tag.
|
||||
if [ -n "$(cd "$SOURCE_DIR" && git status --porcelain 2>/dev/null)" ]; then
|
||||
echo "WARNING: working tree has uncommitted changes." >&2
|
||||
echo " build.h will include '-dirty' suffix and the binary will NOT be" >&2
|
||||
echo " reproducible. Commit/stash your changes first, or accept that the" >&2
|
||||
echo " hashes below prove your dirty-tree build is at least internally consistent." >&2
|
||||
fi
|
||||
|
||||
# ── Helpers ────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────
|
||||
build_one() {
|
||||
local dir="$1" log="$2"
|
||||
rm -rf "$dir"
|
||||
mkdir -p "$dir"
|
||||
echo " configuring in $dir (BUILD_TYPE=$BUILD_TYPE BUILD_QT=$BUILD_QT)..." >&2
|
||||
cmake -S "$SOURCE_DIR" -B "$dir" \
|
||||
-DCMAKE_BUILD_TYPE="$BUILD_TYPE" \
|
||||
-DBUILD_QT="$BUILD_QT" \
|
||||
> "$log" 2>&1 || { echo " configure failed; see $log" >&2; tail -30 "$log" >&2; exit 3; }
|
||||
echo " building target $TARGET..." >&2
|
||||
cmake --build "$dir" --target "$TARGET" -j "$(nproc)" \
|
||||
>> "$log" 2>&1 || { echo " build failed; see $log" >&2; tail -30 "$log" >&2; exit 3; }
|
||||
# ONLY stdout of the find goes to the caller. Progress logs above
|
||||
# were redirected to stderr so they don't pollute the captured path.
|
||||
find "$dir" -name "$TARGET" -type f -executable | head -1
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
# ── Build twice ────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────
|
||||
echo "Building $TARGET ($BUILD_TYPE) twice from $SOURCE_DIR..."
|
||||
echo ""
|
||||
BIN_A="$(build_one "$BUILD_DIR_A" "$LOG_A")"
|
||||
BIN_B="$(build_one "$BUILD_DIR_B" "$LOG_B")"
|
||||
|
||||
if [ -z "$BIN_A" ] || [ -z "$BIN_B" ]; then
|
||||
echo "ERROR: could not find built binary" >&2
|
||||
echo " A: '$BIN_A'" >&2
|
||||
echo " B: '$BIN_B'" >&2
|
||||
exit 4
|
||||
fi
|
||||
|
||||
# ── Compare ────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────
|
||||
HASH_A="$(sha256sum "$BIN_A" | awk '{print $1}')"
|
||||
HASH_B="$(sha256sum "$BIN_B" | awk '{print $1}')"
|
||||
SIZE_A="$(stat -c%s "$BIN_A" 2>/dev/null || stat -f%z "$BIN_A")"
|
||||
SIZE_B="$(stat -c%s "$BIN_B" 2>/dev/null || stat -f%z "$BIN_B")"
|
||||
|
||||
echo ""
|
||||
echo "Binary A: $BIN_A"
|
||||
echo " sha256: $HASH_A"
|
||||
echo " size: $SIZE_A bytes"
|
||||
echo "Binary B: $BIN_B"
|
||||
echo " sha256: $HASH_B"
|
||||
echo " size: $SIZE_B bytes"
|
||||
echo ""
|
||||
|
||||
if [ "$HASH_A" = "$HASH_B" ]; then
|
||||
echo "✓ REPRODUCIBLE: both builds produced identical SHA256"
|
||||
exit 0
|
||||
else
|
||||
echo "✗ NOT REPRODUCIBLE: hashes differ"
|
||||
echo ""
|
||||
echo "Likely causes:"
|
||||
echo " - __DATE__/__TIME__ embedded (check src/version.cpp)"
|
||||
echo " - absolute build paths in __FILE__ (check CMakeLists.txt for -ffile-prefix-map)"
|
||||
echo " - dirty git tree (commit/stash and rerun)"
|
||||
echo " - PIE base randomization (compile with -fno-pie -no-pie for testing)"
|
||||
echo " - non-deterministic linker output (linker version mismatch)"
|
||||
exit 1
|
||||
fi
|
||||
Reference in New Issue
Block a user