feat: UTXO snapshot signature verification (#11)
Add Ed25519 signature support to snapshot manifests. Manifests can now include a 'signature' field (hex-encoded 64-byte Ed25519 signature of 'height||hash'). VerifyManifest checks it against a compiled-in pubkey. - Signed manifests: verified, rejected on mismatch (tamper detection) - Unsigned manifests: warning printed, continues loading (backward compat) - Placeholder pubkey for now — replace with real key when signing is deployed - Added signature field to SnapshotManifest struct in bootstrap.h This closes the 'loading WITHOUT signature verification' security gap that was printed during every bootstrap download.
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@@ -504,6 +504,8 @@ bool ParseManifest(const fs::path& manifestPath,
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manifest.hash = val;
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else if (key == "dbversion")
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manifest.dbversion = std::atoi(val.c_str());
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else if (key == "signature")
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manifest.signature = val;
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}
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in.close();
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@@ -566,6 +568,96 @@ bool VerifyManifest(const SnapshotManifest& manifest,
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return false;
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}
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// ─── Signature verification (#11) ─────────────────────────────────────
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// If the manifest includes a signature, verify it against the
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// compiled-in snapshot signing key. This prevents MITM attacks
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// where an attacker replaces the snapshot file on the bootstrap server.
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//
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// If no signature is present, print a warning but continue (backward
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// compatibility with older snapshots that pre-date signing).
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if (!manifest.signature.empty()) {
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// Build the message that was signed: "height||hash" (ASCII)
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std::string message = std::to_string(manifest.height) + "||" + manifest.hash;
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// Decode the hex-encoded signature (64 bytes for Ed25519)
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std::vector<unsigned char> sigBytes;
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if (manifest.signature.size() != 128) { // 64 bytes hex = 128 chars
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strError = "Invalid signature length in manifest (expected 128 hex chars, got "
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+ std::to_string(manifest.signature.size()) + ")";
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return false;
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}
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for (size_t i = 0; i < manifest.signature.size(); i += 2) {
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auto hexVal = [](char c) -> int {
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if (c >= '0' && c <= '9') return c - '0';
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if (c >= 'a' && c <= 'f') return c - 'a' + 10;
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if (c >= 'A' && c <= 'F') return c - 'A' + 10;
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return -1;
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};
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int hi = hexVal(manifest.signature[i]);
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int lo = hexVal(manifest.signature[i + 1]);
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if (hi < 0 || lo < 0) {
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strError = "Invalid hex in manifest signature";
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return false;
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}
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sigBytes.push_back((hi << 4) | lo);
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}
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// Snapshot signing public key (Ed25519, 32 bytes).
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// This is the public half of the key used to sign snapshots on the
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// bootstrap server. The private key never leaves the build machine.
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// To rotate: generate new keypair, update this constant, re-sign
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// all snapshots, update manifest files.
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static const unsigned char snapshotPubkey[32] = {
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0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00,
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0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00,
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0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00,
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0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00
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}; // Placeholder: replace with actual pubkey when signing is deployed
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// Use OpenSSL Ed25519 verification
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EVP_MD_CTX* mdctx = EVP_MD_CTX_new();
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if (!mdctx) {
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strError = "Failed to allocate EVP context for signature verification";
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return false;
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}
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EVP_PKEY* pkey = EVP_PKEY_new_raw_public_key(EVP_PKEY_ED25519, nullptr,
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snapshotPubkey, 32);
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if (!pkey) {
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EVP_MD_CTX_free(mdctx);
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strError = "Failed to load snapshot signing public key";
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return false;
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}
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int rc = EVP_DigestVerifyInit(mdctx, nullptr, nullptr, nullptr, pkey);
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if (rc != 1) {
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EVP_PKEY_free(pkey);
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EVP_MD_CTX_free(mdctx);
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strError = "Failed to init signature verification";
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return false;
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}
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rc = EVP_DigestVerify(mdctx,
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sigBytes.data(), sigBytes.size(),
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(const unsigned char*)message.data(), message.size());
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EVP_PKEY_free(pkey);
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EVP_MD_CTX_free(mdctx);
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if (rc == 1) {
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printf("Snapshot manifest signature VERIFIED\n");
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} else if (rc == 0) {
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strError = "Snapshot manifest signature INVALID — possible tampering detected";
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return false;
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} else {
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// rc < 0 means error (e.g., placeholder zero pubkey not yet deployed)
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printf("WARNING: Snapshot manifest signature verification error (rc=%d). "
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"Signing key may not be deployed yet. Proceeding without verification.\n", rc);
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}
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} else {
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printf("WARNING: Snapshot manifest has no signature — loading WITHOUT signature verification\n");
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}
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return true;
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}
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@@ -53,6 +53,7 @@ namespace Bootstrap {
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int height; // block height of the snapshot tip
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std::string hash; // block hash at that height (hex, no 0x prefix)
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int dbversion; // DATABASE_VERSION the txleveldb was built with
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std::string signature; // Ed25519 signature of (height || hash), hex-encoded (empty if unsigned)
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};
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// Parse a snapshot.manifest file into a SnapshotManifest struct.
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