test: keystore + V5 soft-cap coverage (#29)

Two coverage gaps closed in one commit because they were both identified during the same test audit pass. --- keystore_tests.cpp (NEW, 472 lines) --- The keystore layer guards every spendable key in the wallet: a bug here loses keys, accepts wrong keys, or breaks encryption round-trips. The audit flagged it as security-critical with zero coverage. 27 cases: - CBasicKeyStore: add/have/get roundtrips, missing-key negative cases, pubkey derivation paths, secret compressed-flag preservation, GetKeys enumeration + input-set clearing, CScript storage (BIP-0013) roundtrips and idempotency. - CCryptoKeyStore: state machine (initial state, LockKeyStore flip, refuse-to-Lock-when-plaintext-keys-exist), encrypt/decrypt roundtrip with the documented EncryptKeys -> Unlock sequence (not Unlock on a plaintext store, which SetCrypted refuses), wrong-master rejection, AddKey-when-locked refusal, AddKey-when-crypted-and-unlocked actually encrypts, crypted-mode HaveKey/GetKeys/GetPubKey paths, edge cases (empty store Unlock, double Unlock). Uses TestableCryptoKeyStore (a unit-test-only subclass that widens the protected Unlock/EncryptKeys access via using-declarations) so the test can drive the protected paths without modifying production code. --- staking_tests.cpp: GetWeight V5 soft-cap (8 cases) --- The 2026-04-20 deploy added a 7-day soft cap to GetWeight that activates ONLY when BOTH height >= FORK_HEIGHT_V5 (17651) AND nIntervalEnd >= STAKE_AGE_SOFT_CAP_ACTIVATION (1776000000 = 2026-04-12 ~13:20 UTC). This is the production code path for every stake on the live chain since the deploy. The existing staking_tests only covered the pre-V5 (nStakeMaxAge hard cap) path, plus one negative test that confirmed the soft cap does NOT apply pre-V5. The two production regimes -- V5+post-activation and V5+pre-activation -- had no direct test coverage. Adds 8 cases: - V5+post-activation: cap at 7 days for stakes past the cap - V5+post-activation: linear below the cap - V5+post-activation: exactly at the cap (boundary) - V5+post-activation: 1 second past the cap (boundary) - V5+pre-activation: UNcapped (historical stakes preserve original rules) - V5+activation-exact: >= semantics include the activation timestamp - V5+high height (2.5M, like DNS2 live): cap unchanged by distance from fork - V5+min-age floor: nStakeMinAge still returns 0 below floor Uses RAII (BestChainGuard) to scope pindexBest swaps so a failed assertion can't leave a stack pointer dangling in the global -- an improvement over the manual save/restore pattern used in consensus_safety_tests. Verified: full test_triangles suite green (0 errors). Keystore 27/27, staking 11/11 (3 original + 8 new), 21713+ assertions, ctest 4/4. Co-authored-by: Sami Ahmed <sami@sami-ahmed.net>
2026-07-11 16:02:39 -07:00
parent 9a50ab3b2e
commit db467925ca
2 changed files with 635 additions and 0 deletions
@@ -0,0 +1,472 @@
+// Copyright (c) 2026 Triangles developers
+// Tests for CKeyStore / CBasicKeyStore / CCryptoKeyStore
+//
+// Added 2026-07-06 during the test audit. The keystore layer guards every
+// spendable key in the wallet: a bug here can lose keys, accept wrong keys,
+// or break encryption round-trips. CCrypter itself is covered by
+// crypter_tests.cpp -- this suite focuses on the keystore's map operations,
+// lock/unlock state machine, and the encrypt-on-AddKey / decrypt-on-GetKey
+// flow that combines CCrypter with the keystore.
+//
+// No new crypto primitives are introduced -- we exercise existing
+// CKeyStore / CCryptoKeyStore public APIs. Test vectors come from running
+// the code itself under observation (round-trip patterns) rather than from
+// hand-written hex values.
+
+#include <boost/test/unit_test.hpp>
+
+#include "../keystore.h"
+#include "../key.h"
+#include "../script.h"
+#include "../crypter.h"
+
+#include <string>
+#include <vector>
+
+BOOST_AUTO_TEST_SUITE(keystore_tests)
+
+// Test-only subclass that exposes the protected Unlock/EncryptKeys paths.
+// In production these are called by CWallet after reading the master key
+// from disk; from a unit test we don't have that driver, so we widen the
+// access narrowly for testing. The override is a passthrough (no behavior
+// change) -- it exists only so the test can drive the protected methods
+// without modifying production code.
+class TestableCryptoKeyStore : public CCryptoKeyStore
+{
+public:
+    using CCryptoKeyStore::Unlock;
+    using CCryptoKeyStore::EncryptKeys;
+};
+
+// Helper: derive a deterministic master key from a passphrase for use in
+// encryption tests. Avoids hand-written 64-byte hex strings (see
+// crypto-primitive-vendoring pitfall #8).
+static CKeyingMaterial DeriveMasterKey(const std::string& passphrase)
+{
+    CKeyingMaterial vMasterKey;
+    RandAddSeedPerfmon();
+    vMasterKey.resize(WALLET_CRYPTO_KEY_SIZE);
+    // Passphrase hash truncated to WALLET_CRYPTO_KEY_SIZE matches the
+    // wallet's own pre-key setup in CCryptoKeyStore::Unlock.
+    auto hash = Hash(passphrase.begin(), passphrase.end());
+    memcpy(vMasterKey.data(), hash.begin(),
+           std::min((size_t)WALLET_CRYPTO_KEY_SIZE, (size_t)hash.size()));
+    return vMasterKey;
+}
+
+// --- CBasicKeyStore: plain (unencrypted) key storage ---
+
+BOOST_AUTO_TEST_CASE(basic_keystore_add_then_have)
+{
+    CBasicKeyStore ks;
+    CKey key;
+    key.MakeNewKey(true);
+
+    BOOST_CHECK(ks.AddKey(key));
+    BOOST_CHECK(ks.HaveKey(key.GetPubKey().GetID()));
+}
+
+BOOST_AUTO_TEST_CASE(basic_keystore_have_missing_returns_false)
+{
+    CBasicKeyStore ks;
+    CKey key;
+    key.MakeNewKey(true);
+
+    BOOST_CHECK(!ks.HaveKey(key.GetPubKey().GetID()));
+}
+
+BOOST_AUTO_TEST_CASE(basic_keystore_get_roundtrip)
+{
+    CBasicKeyStore ks;
+    CKey key;
+    key.MakeNewKey(true);
+    ks.AddKey(key);
+
+    CKey recovered;
+    BOOST_CHECK(ks.GetKey(key.GetPubKey().GetID(), recovered));
+
+    // The recovered key must produce the same public key (proof of
+    // faithful round-trip of the underlying secret bytes).
+    BOOST_CHECK(recovered.GetPubKey() == key.GetPubKey());
+}
+
+BOOST_AUTO_TEST_CASE(basic_keystore_get_missing_returns_false)
+{
+    CBasicKeyStore ks;
+    CKey key;
+    key.MakeNewKey(true);
+
+    CKey recovered;
+    BOOST_CHECK(!ks.GetKey(key.GetPubKey().GetID(), recovered));
+}
+
+BOOST_AUTO_TEST_CASE(basic_keystore_get_pubkey_matches_get_key)
+{
+    // CKeyStore::GetPubKey default impl calls GetKey then derives pubkey;
+    // verify the two paths agree.
+    CBasicKeyStore ks;
+    CKey key;
+    key.MakeNewKey(true);
+    ks.AddKey(key);
+
+    CKey recovered;
+    CPubKey pub;
+    BOOST_CHECK(ks.GetKey(key.GetPubKey().GetID(), recovered));
+    BOOST_CHECK(ks.GetPubKey(key.GetPubKey().GetID(), pub));
+    BOOST_CHECK(pub == key.GetPubKey());
+    BOOST_CHECK(pub == recovered.GetPubKey());
+}
+
+BOOST_AUTO_TEST_CASE(basic_keystore_get_pubkey_missing_returns_false)
+{
+    CBasicKeyStore ks;
+    CKey key;
+    key.MakeNewKey(true);
+
+    CPubKey pub;
+    BOOST_CHECK(!ks.GetPubKey(key.GetPubKey().GetID(), pub));
+}
+
+BOOST_AUTO_TEST_CASE(basic_keystore_get_secret_compressed_flag_preserved)
+{
+    // The keystore stores (secret, compressed) pairs. A compressed key
+    // added must come back as a compressed key.
+    CBasicKeyStore ks;
+    CKey compressed;
+    compressed.MakeNewKey(true);  // compressed=true
+    ks.AddKey(compressed);
+
+    CSecret secret;
+    bool fCompressed = false;
+    BOOST_CHECK(ks.GetSecret(compressed.GetPubKey().GetID(), secret, fCompressed));
+    BOOST_CHECK(fCompressed);
+
+    // Now an uncompressed key.
+    CBasicKeyStore ks2;
+    CKey uncompressed;
+    uncompressed.MakeNewKey(false);  // compressed=false
+    ks2.AddKey(uncompressed);
+
+    BOOST_CHECK(ks2.GetSecret(uncompressed.GetPubKey().GetID(), secret, fCompressed));
+    BOOST_CHECK(!fCompressed);
+}
+
+BOOST_AUTO_TEST_CASE(basic_keystore_getkeys_returns_all_added)
+{
+    CBasicKeyStore ks;
+    CKey k1, k2, k3;
+    k1.MakeNewKey(true);
+    k2.MakeNewKey(true);
+    k3.MakeNewKey(true);
+    ks.AddKey(k1);
+    ks.AddKey(k2);
+    ks.AddKey(k3);
+
+    std::set<CKeyID> setAddr;
+    ks.GetKeys(setAddr);
+    BOOST_CHECK_EQUAL(setAddr.size(), 3u);
+    BOOST_CHECK(setAddr.count(k1.GetPubKey().GetID()) == 1);
+    BOOST_CHECK(setAddr.count(k2.GetPubKey().GetID()) == 1);
+    BOOST_CHECK(setAddr.count(k3.GetPubKey().GetID()) == 1);
+}
+
+BOOST_AUTO_TEST_CASE(basic_keystore_getkeys_empty_store)
+{
+    CBasicKeyStore ks;
+    std::set<CKeyID> setAddr;
+    ks.GetKeys(setAddr);
+    BOOST_CHECK_EQUAL(setAddr.size(), 0u);
+}
+
+BOOST_AUTO_TEST_CASE(basic_keystore_getkeys_clears_input_set)
+{
+    // GetKeys must clear the caller's set first -- if it didn't, leftover
+    // entries from a prior call would silently corrupt downstream code.
+    CBasicKeyStore ks;
+    CKey k;
+    k.MakeNewKey(true);
+    ks.AddKey(k);
+
+    std::set<CKeyID> setAddr;
+    setAddr.insert(uint160(42));  // garbage left in
+    ks.GetKeys(setAddr);
+    BOOST_CHECK_EQUAL(setAddr.size(), 1u);  // only the real key, garbage gone
+}
+
+// --- CBasicKeyStore: CScript storage (BIP-0013 / P2SH) ---
+
+BOOST_AUTO_TEST_CASE(basic_keystore_addcscript_then_have)
+{
+    CBasicKeyStore ks;
+    CScript script = CScript() << OP_1 << OP_2 << OP_3;
+
+    BOOST_CHECK(ks.AddCScript(script));
+    BOOST_CHECK(ks.HaveCScript(script.GetID()));
+}
+
+BOOST_AUTO_TEST_CASE(basic_keystore_havecscript_missing)
+{
+    CBasicKeyStore ks;
+    CScript script = CScript() << OP_1 << OP_2 << OP_3;
+    BOOST_CHECK(!ks.HaveCScript(script.GetID()));
+}
+
+BOOST_AUTO_TEST_CASE(basic_keystore_getcscript_roundtrip)
+{
+    CBasicKeyStore ks;
+    CScript original = CScript() << OP_DUP << OP_HASH160 <<
+        std::vector<unsigned char>{0x01, 0x02, 0x03} << OP_EQUALVERIFY << OP_CHECKSIG;
+    ks.AddCScript(original);
+
+    CScript recovered;
+    BOOST_CHECK(ks.GetCScript(original.GetID(), recovered));
+    BOOST_CHECK(recovered == original);
+}
+
+BOOST_AUTO_TEST_CASE(basic_keystore_getcscript_missing)
+{
+    CBasicKeyStore ks;
+    CScript script = CScript() << OP_1;
+    CScript recovered;
+    BOOST_CHECK(!ks.GetCScript(script.GetID(), recovered));
+}
+
+BOOST_AUTO_TEST_CASE(basic_keystore_addcscript_idempotent)
+{
+    // Adding the same script twice must NOT corrupt the store. The second
+    // insert just replaces the value at the same script ID.
+    CBasicKeyStore ks;
+    CScript s = CScript() << OP_1 << OP_2;
+    ks.AddCScript(s);
+    ks.AddCScript(s);
+    BOOST_CHECK(ks.HaveCScript(s.GetID()));
+}
+
+// --- CCryptoKeyStore: state machine (IsCrypted / IsLocked) ---
+
+BOOST_AUTO_TEST_CASE(crypto_keystore_starts_uncrypted_unlocked)
+{
+    TestableCryptoKeyStore cks;
+    BOOST_CHECK(!cks.IsCrypted());
+    BOOST_CHECK(!cks.IsLocked());
+}
+
+BOOST_AUTO_TEST_CASE(crypto_keystore_lock_sets_crypted)
+{
+    // LockKeyStore flips the store into crypted mode (forced SetCrypted)
+    // and clears the master key. After Lock, IsCrypted() && IsLocked().
+    TestableCryptoKeyStore cks;
+    BOOST_CHECK(cks.LockKeyStore());
+    BOOST_CHECK(cks.IsCrypted());
+    BOOST_CHECK(cks.IsLocked());
+}
+
+BOOST_AUTO_TEST_CASE(crypto_keystore_lock_with_plain_keys_refuses)
+{
+    // The SetCrypted precondition: if mapKeys is non-empty, we refuse to
+    // switch to crypted mode (those plain keys would be lost). Must call
+    // EncryptKeys first to migrate them.
+    TestableCryptoKeyStore cks;
+    CKey k;
+    k.MakeNewKey(true);
+    BOOST_CHECK(cks.AddKey(k));  // goes into mapKeys (uncrypted path)
+    BOOST_CHECK(!cks.LockKeyStore());  // must refuse: plaintext keys exist
+}
+
+// --- CCryptoKeyStore: encrypt / decrypt round trip ---
+
+BOOST_AUTO_TEST_CASE(crypto_keystore_addkey_when_locked_refuses)
+{
+    // Locked store has no master key to encrypt new secrets with. AddKey
+    // must refuse rather than silently insert a plaintext key.
+    TestableCryptoKeyStore cks;
+    cks.LockKeyStore();
+    CKey k;
+    k.MakeNewKey(true);
+    BOOST_CHECK(!cks.AddKey(k));
+}
+
+BOOST_AUTO_TEST_CASE(crypto_keystore_encrypt_then_decrypt_roundtrip)
+{
+    // End-to-end: add key in plaintext mode, encrypt the store with a
+    // passphrase-derived master key (EncryptKeys migrates plaintext ->
+    // encrypted), then verify the key round-trips through lock/unlock
+    // cycles.
+    //
+    // Important: Unlock() refuses when mapKeys is non-empty (SetCrypted's
+    // precondition). EncryptKeys() is the bridge -- it moves plaintext
+    // keys into the encrypted map. After EncryptKeys, the store is crypted
+    // but the master key is NOT yet held (EncryptKeys never sets vMasterKey)
+    // -- a subsequent Unlock() installs it. This is documented behavior;
+    // the wallet layer sequences EncryptKeys + Unlock in that order when
+    // migrating a wallet from unencrypted to encrypted.
+    TestableCryptoKeyStore cks;
+    CKey k;
+    k.MakeNewKey(true);
+    BOOST_CHECK(cks.AddKey(k));  // plain path -> mapKeys
+
+    CKeyingMaterial master = DeriveMasterKey("correct horse battery staple");
+    BOOST_CHECK(cks.EncryptKeys(master));  // migrate plaintext -> encrypted
+
+    // After EncryptKeys: crypted mode on, but master key not yet held.
+    BOOST_CHECK(cks.IsCrypted());
+    BOOST_CHECK(cks.IsLocked());
+
+    // Unlock installs the master key and verifies by attempting to decrypt.
+    BOOST_CHECK(cks.Unlock(master));
+    BOOST_CHECK(!cks.IsLocked());
+
+    CKey recovered;
+    BOOST_CHECK(cks.GetKey(k.GetPubKey().GetID(), recovered));
+    BOOST_CHECK(recovered.GetPubKey() == k.GetPubKey());
+
+    // Lock and verify we still get the right key back when unlocked.
+    BOOST_CHECK(cks.LockKeyStore());
+    BOOST_CHECK(cks.IsLocked());
+    BOOST_CHECK(cks.Unlock(master));
+    BOOST_CHECK(cks.GetKey(k.GetPubKey().GetID(), recovered));
+    BOOST_CHECK(recovered.GetPubKey() == k.GetPubKey());
+}
+
+BOOST_AUTO_TEST_CASE(crypto_keystore_unlock_with_wrong_master_fails)
+{
+    // Unlock must reject a wrong master key without crashing. (DecryptSecret
+    // returns false on bad material; Unlock propagates that.)
+    //
+    // Setup: build a fully encrypted store via Unlock on empty + AddKey +
+    // LockKeyStore, so the second Unlock runs against a non-empty crypted
+    // store.
+    TestableCryptoKeyStore cks;
+    CKey k;
+    k.MakeNewKey(true);
+
+    CKeyingMaterial correctMaster = DeriveMasterKey("the right one");
+    CKeyingMaterial wrongMaster = DeriveMasterKey("the wrong one");
+
+    // Bootstrap into the crypted state with the correct master.
+    BOOST_CHECK(cks.Unlock(correctMaster));
+    cks.AddKey(k);
+    cks.LockKeyStore();
+
+    BOOST_CHECK(!cks.Unlock(wrongMaster));
+    // Correct master still works.
+    BOOST_CHECK(cks.Unlock(correctMaster));
+}
+
+BOOST_AUTO_TEST_CASE(crypto_keystore_addkey_when_crypted_and_unlocked_encrypts)
+{
+    // After Unlock, AddKey should encrypt the new key on insert (not
+    // silently drop it into mapKeys). We verify by locking, unlocking with
+    // the same master, and reading the key back.
+    TestableCryptoKeyStore cks;
+    CKeyingMaterial master = DeriveMasterKey("test");
+    BOOST_CHECK(cks.Unlock(master));  // creates empty crypted store
+
+    CKey k;
+    k.MakeNewKey(true);
+    BOOST_CHECK(cks.AddKey(k));
+
+    cks.LockKeyStore();
+    BOOST_CHECK(cks.Unlock(master));
+
+    CKey recovered;
+    BOOST_CHECK(cks.GetKey(k.GetPubKey().GetID(), recovered));
+    BOOST_CHECK(recovered.GetPubKey() == k.GetPubKey());
+}
+
+BOOST_AUTO_TEST_CASE(crypto_keystore_havekey_when_crypted_uses_crypted_map)
+{
+    // HaveKey's crypted-mode branch must look at mapCryptedKeys, not
+    // mapKeys. Without this, HaveKey would say "no" for a key the store
+    // can actually decrypt.
+    TestableCryptoKeyStore cks;
+    CKeyingMaterial master = DeriveMasterKey("test");
+    cks.Unlock(master);
+
+    CKey k;
+    k.MakeNewKey(true);
+    cks.AddKey(k);
+
+    BOOST_CHECK(cks.HaveKey(k.GetPubKey().GetID()));
+}
+
+BOOST_AUTO_TEST_CASE(crypto_keystore_getkeys_crypted_lists_crypted_keys)
+{
+    // GetKeys in crypted mode must enumerate mapCryptedKeys, not mapKeys.
+    // Empty mapKeys + populated mapCryptedKeys -> set contains the crypted
+    // key.
+    TestableCryptoKeyStore cks;
+    CKeyingMaterial master = DeriveMasterKey("test");
+    cks.Unlock(master);
+
+    CKey k1, k2;
+    k1.MakeNewKey(true);
+    k2.MakeNewKey(true);
+    cks.AddKey(k1);
+    cks.AddKey(k2);
+
+    std::set<CKeyID> setAddr;
+    cks.GetKeys(setAddr);
+    BOOST_CHECK_EQUAL(setAddr.size(), 2u);
+    BOOST_CHECK(setAddr.count(k1.GetPubKey().GetID()) == 1);
+    BOOST_CHECK(setAddr.count(k2.GetPubKey().GetID()) == 1);
+}
+
+// --- CCryptoKeyStore: GetPubKey in crypted mode ---
+
+BOOST_AUTO_TEST_CASE(crypto_keystore_getpubkey_crypted_returns_stored_pubkey)
+{
+    // In crypted mode, GetPubKey must read from mapCryptedKeys (storing
+    // the CPubKey alongside the encrypted secret) -- it can't derive pubkey
+    // from the decrypted secret without the master key.
+    TestableCryptoKeyStore cks;
+    CKeyingMaterial master = DeriveMasterKey("test");
+    cks.Unlock(master);
+
+    CKey k;
+    k.MakeNewKey(true);
+    cks.AddKey(k);
+
+    // Lock so GetPubKey must take the crypted-only path (no master key
+    // available to derive pubkey from secret).
+    cks.LockKeyStore();
+
+    CPubKey pub;
+    BOOST_CHECK(cks.GetPubKey(k.GetPubKey().GetID(), pub));
+    BOOST_CHECK(pub == k.GetPubKey());
+}
+
+// --- CCryptoKeyStore: edge cases ---
+
+BOOST_AUTO_TEST_CASE(crypto_keystore_unlock_empty_store_succeeds)
+{
+    // Unlocking an empty crypted store must succeed -- there's nothing to
+    // verify, so any master key (even "wrong") is acceptable. (The
+    // for-loop body never executes, the for-range is empty.)
+    TestableCryptoKeyStore cks;
+    BOOST_CHECK(cks.Unlock(DeriveMasterKey("anything")));
+    BOOST_CHECK(cks.IsCrypted());
+    BOOST_CHECK(!cks.IsLocked());
+}
+
+BOOST_AUTO_TEST_CASE(crypto_keystore_double_unlock_succeeds)
+{
+    // Calling Unlock twice with the same master is idempotent: the second
+    // call re-decrypts and re-sets the master key. Both calls succeed.
+    TestableCryptoKeyStore cks;
+    CKeyingMaterial master = DeriveMasterKey("test");
+    cks.Unlock(master);
+
+    CKey k;
+    k.MakeNewKey(true);
+    cks.AddKey(k);
+
+    BOOST_CHECK(cks.Unlock(master));
+    BOOST_CHECK(cks.Unlock(master));
+
+    CKey recovered;
+    BOOST_CHECK(cks.GetKey(k.GetPubKey().GetID(), recovered));
+    BOOST_CHECK(recovered.GetPubKey() == k.GetPubKey());
+}
+
+BOOST_AUTO_TEST_SUITE_END()
@@ -153,4 +153,167 @@ BOOST_AUTO_TEST_CASE(pos_reward_large_coinage)
    BOOST_CHECK(reward > 0);
 }

+// --- GetWeight: V5 soft-cap behavior (post-2026-04-12 fork fix) ---
+//
+// The 2026-04-20 deploy changed GetWeight to apply a 7-day soft cap on
+// stake weight instead of the hard nStakeMaxAge (= 12 hours) cap, but only
+// after a height AND a timestamp gate:
+//   - height must be >= FORK_HEIGHT_V5 (= 17651), AND
+//   - nIntervalEnd must be >= STAKE_AGE_SOFT_CAP_ACTIVATION (= 1776000000,
+//     2026-04-12 ~13:20 UTC).
+//
+// Pre-V5 path stays at hard nStakeMaxAge cap (regression-tested above).
+// V5 + pre-activation path is INTENTIONALLY uncapped (historical stakes
+// validate under the rules they were staked with).
+// V5 + post-activation path applies the 7-day soft cap.
+//
+// These tests use RAII to scope pindexBest swaps so a failed assertion
+// can't leave a stack pointer dangling in the global. The mock CBlockIndex
+// only needs nHeight populated; GetWeight reads nothing else from it.
+
+// RAII guard: install a synthetic pindexBest on construction, restore the
+// prior value on destruction. Mandatory because boost CHECK failures
+// throw, and a manual pindexBest restore in the catch-less path leaks the
+// stack pointer into the global -- corrupting every subsequent test in
+// the suite.
+struct BestChainGuard
+{
+    CBlockIndex* prev;
+    explicit BestChainGuard(CBlockIndex* mock) : prev(pindexBest) { pindexBest = mock; }
+    ~BestChainGuard() { pindexBest = prev; }
+};
+
+static const int64_t STAKE_AGE_SOFT_CAP_DAYS = 7;
+static const int64_t STAKE_AGE_SOFT_CAP_TEST_SECS = STAKE_AGE_SOFT_CAP_DAYS * 24 * 60 * 60;
+static const int64_t STAKE_AGE_SOFT_CAP_ACTIVATION_TEST = 1776000000;
+static const int64_t STAKE_AGE_MAX_TEST = 10 * 24 * 60 * 60;  // 10 days -- past the 7-day cap
+
+BOOST_AUTO_TEST_CASE(weight_v5_post_activation_capped_at_7_days)
+{
+    // V5 + post-activation: a 10-day-old stake should be capped at 7 days.
+    // This is the production code path for every stake on the live chain
+    // since 2026-04-20 -- the highest-value missing test.
+    CBlockIndex mockBest;
+    mockBest.nHeight = FORK_HEIGHT_V5;  // 17651, just at the fork
+    BestChainGuard guard(&mockBest);
+
+    int64_t now = STAKE_AGE_SOFT_CAP_ACTIVATION_TEST + (30 * 24 * 60 * 60);  // 30 days post-activation
+    int64_t tenDaysOld = now - nStakeMinAge - STAKE_AGE_MAX_TEST;
+
+    int64_t weight = GetWeight(tenDaysOld, now);
+    BOOST_CHECK_EQUAL(weight, STAKE_AGE_SOFT_CAP_TEST_SECS);
+}
+
+BOOST_AUTO_TEST_CASE(weight_v5_post_activation_below_cap_is_linear)
+{
+    // V5 + post-activation: a stake younger than the 7-day cap should
+    // return the raw nAge (capping only applies past the limit).
+    CBlockIndex mockBest;
+    mockBest.nHeight = FORK_HEIGHT_V5;
+    BestChainGuard guard(&mockBest);
+
+    int64_t now = STAKE_AGE_SOFT_CAP_ACTIVATION_TEST + (30 * 24 * 60 * 60);
+    int64_t threeDaysOld = now - nStakeMinAge - (3 * 24 * 60 * 60);
+
+    int64_t weight = GetWeight(threeDaysOld, now);
+    BOOST_CHECK_EQUAL(weight, 3 * 24 * 60 * 60);
+}
+
+BOOST_AUTO_TEST_CASE(weight_v5_post_activation_exactly_7_days)
+{
+    // V5 + post-activation: exactly at the cap should return cap value.
+    CBlockIndex mockBest;
+    mockBest.nHeight = FORK_HEIGHT_V5;
+    BestChainGuard guard(&mockBest);
+
+    int64_t now = STAKE_AGE_SOFT_CAP_ACTIVATION_TEST + (30 * 24 * 60 * 60);
+    int64_t exactlySevenDays = now - nStakeMinAge - STAKE_AGE_SOFT_CAP_TEST_SECS;
+
+    int64_t weight = GetWeight(exactlySevenDays, now);
+    BOOST_CHECK_EQUAL(weight, STAKE_AGE_SOFT_CAP_TEST_SECS);
+}
+
+BOOST_AUTO_TEST_CASE(weight_v5_post_activation_one_second_past_cap)
+{
+    // V5 + post-activation: 1 second past the cap should still be capped
+    // (min() boundary semantics).
+    CBlockIndex mockBest;
+    mockBest.nHeight = FORK_HEIGHT_V5;
+    BestChainGuard guard(&mockBest);
+
+    int64_t now = STAKE_AGE_SOFT_CAP_ACTIVATION_TEST + (30 * 24 * 60 * 60);
+    int64_t justPastCap = now - nStakeMinAge - STAKE_AGE_SOFT_CAP_TEST_SECS - 1;
+
+    int64_t weight = GetWeight(justPastCap, now);
+    BOOST_CHECK_EQUAL(weight, STAKE_AGE_SOFT_CAP_TEST_SECS);
+}
+
+BOOST_AUTO_TEST_CASE(weight_v5_pre_activation_is_uncapped)
+{
+    // V5 active (height >= 17651) but stake timestamp is BEFORE the
+    // activation gate. This is the "historical stakes validate under the
+    // rules they were created with" path. A 30-day-old stake with
+    // nIntervalEnd pre-activation should NOT be capped at 7 days or at
+    // nStakeMaxAge -- it returns the raw nAge. This is intentional:
+    // changing the cap retroactively would hard-fork historical blocks.
+    CBlockIndex mockBest;
+    mockBest.nHeight = FORK_HEIGHT_V5;
+    BestChainGuard guard(&mockBest);
+
+    int64_t now = STAKE_AGE_SOFT_CAP_ACTIVATION_TEST - 1;  // 1 second before activation
+    int64_t thirtyDaysOld = now - nStakeMinAge - (30 * 24 * 60 * 60);
+
+    int64_t weight = GetWeight(thirtyDaysOld, now);
+    BOOST_CHECK_EQUAL(weight, 30 * 24 * 60 * 60);  // raw nAge, no cap
+}
+
+BOOST_AUTO_TEST_CASE(weight_v5_exactly_at_activation_is_capped)
+{
+    // V5 + nIntervalEnd exactly equal to the activation timestamp.
+    // Boundary semantics: `>=` means AT the timestamp counts as activated,
+    // so the 7-day cap applies. (Confirmed against the source: line 47
+    // is `if (nIntervalEnd >= STAKE_AGE_SOFT_CAP_ACTIVATION) return min(...)`)
+    CBlockIndex mockBest;
+    mockBest.nHeight = FORK_HEIGHT_V5;
+    BestChainGuard guard(&mockBest);
+
+    int64_t now = STAKE_AGE_SOFT_CAP_ACTIVATION_TEST;  // exactly at activation
+    int64_t tenDaysOld = now - nStakeMinAge - STAKE_AGE_MAX_TEST;
+
+    int64_t weight = GetWeight(tenDaysOld, now);
+    BOOST_CHECK_EQUAL(weight, STAKE_AGE_SOFT_CAP_TEST_SECS);  // capped at 7 days
+}
+
+BOOST_AUTO_TEST_CASE(weight_v5_high_height_same_as_fork_height)
+{
+    // V5 + post-activation at a height FAR past the fork (e.g. the live
+    // DNS2 chain at height ~2.2M). Cap should still apply identically --
+    // the soft cap doesn't weaken or strengthen with distance from fork.
+    CBlockIndex mockBest;
+    mockBest.nHeight = 2500000;  // well past FORK_HEIGHT_V5 and FORK_HEIGHT_V5_4
+    BestChainGuard guard(&mockBest);
+
+    int64_t now = STAKE_AGE_SOFT_CAP_ACTIVATION_TEST + (60 * 24 * 60 * 60);
+    int64_t hundredDaysOld = now - nStakeMinAge - (100 * 24 * 60 * 60);
+
+    int64_t weight = GetWeight(hundredDaysOld, now);
+    BOOST_CHECK_EQUAL(weight, STAKE_AGE_SOFT_CAP_TEST_SECS);  // still 7 days, not 100
+}
+
+BOOST_AUTO_TEST_CASE(weight_v5_min_age_floor_still_applies)
+{
+    // V5 + post-activation: nStakeMinAge floor still applies (a coin
+    // younger than min_age returns 0 even if all gates pass). Confirms
+    // the fork change didn't accidentally remove the floor.
+    CBlockIndex mockBest;
+    mockBest.nHeight = FORK_HEIGHT_V5;
+    BestChainGuard guard(&mockBest);
+
+    int64_t now = STAKE_AGE_SOFT_CAP_ACTIVATION_TEST + (30 * 24 * 60 * 60);
+    int64_t tooYoung = now - nStakeMinAge + 1;  // 1 second short of min age
+
+    int64_t weight = GetWeight(tooYoung, now);
+    BOOST_CHECK_EQUAL(weight, 0);
+}
+
 BOOST_AUTO_TEST_SUITE_END()