Files
nyc3/src/modules/ecdh/tests_impl.h
T
Pieter Wuille e7c1b4490f Squashed 'src/secp256k1/' changes from 8225239..84973d3
84973d3 Merge #454: Remove residual parts from the schnorr expirement.
5e95bf2 Remove residual parts from the schnorr expirement.
cbc20b8 Merge #452: Minor optimizations to _scalar_inverse to save 4M
4cc8f52 Merge #437: Unroll secp256k1_fe_(get|set)_b32 to make them much faster.
465159c Further shorten the addition chain for scalar inversion.
a2b6b19 Fix benchmark print_number infinite loop.
8b7680a Unroll secp256k1_fe_(get|set)_b32 for 10x26.
aa84990 Unroll secp256k1_fe_(get|set)_b32 for 5x52.
cf12fa1 Minor optimizations to _scalar_inverse to save 4M
1199492 Merge #408: Add `secp256k1_ec_pubkey_negate` and `secp256k1_ec_privkey_negate`
6af0871 Merge #441: secp256k1_context_randomize: document.
ab31a52 Merge #444: test: Use checked_alloc
eda5c1a Merge #449: Remove executable bit from secp256k1.c
51b77ae Remove executable bit from secp256k1.c
5eb030c test: Use checked_alloc
72d952c FIXUP: Missing "is"
70ff29b secp256k1_context_randomize: document.
9d560f9 Merge #428: Exhaustive recovery
8e48aa6 Add `secp256k1_ec_pubkey_negate` and `secp256k1_ec_privkey_negate`
2cee5fd exhaustive tests: add recovery module
678b0e5 exhaustive tests: remove erroneous comment from ecdsa_sig_sign
03ff8c2 group_impl.h: remove unused `secp256k1_ge_set_infinity` function
a724d72 configure: add --enable-coverage to set options for coverage analysis
b595163 recovery: add tests to cover API misusage
6f8ae2f ecdh: test NULL-checking of arguments
25e3cfb ecdsa_impl: replace scalar if-checks with VERIFY_CHECKs in ecdsa_sig_sign

git-subtree-dir: src/secp256k1
git-subtree-split: 84973d393ac240a90b2e1a6538c5368202bc2224
2017-05-05 11:12:58 -07:00

106 lines
3.7 KiB
C

/**********************************************************************
* Copyright (c) 2015 Andrew Poelstra *
* Distributed under the MIT software license, see the accompanying *
* file COPYING or http://www.opensource.org/licenses/mit-license.php.*
**********************************************************************/
#ifndef _SECP256K1_MODULE_ECDH_TESTS_
#define _SECP256K1_MODULE_ECDH_TESTS_
void test_ecdh_api(void) {
/* Setup context that just counts errors */
secp256k1_context *tctx = secp256k1_context_create(SECP256K1_CONTEXT_SIGN);
secp256k1_pubkey point;
unsigned char res[32];
unsigned char s_one[32] = { 0 };
int32_t ecount = 0;
s_one[31] = 1;
secp256k1_context_set_error_callback(tctx, counting_illegal_callback_fn, &ecount);
secp256k1_context_set_illegal_callback(tctx, counting_illegal_callback_fn, &ecount);
CHECK(secp256k1_ec_pubkey_create(tctx, &point, s_one) == 1);
/* Check all NULLs are detected */
CHECK(secp256k1_ecdh(tctx, res, &point, s_one) == 1);
CHECK(ecount == 0);
CHECK(secp256k1_ecdh(tctx, NULL, &point, s_one) == 0);
CHECK(ecount == 1);
CHECK(secp256k1_ecdh(tctx, res, NULL, s_one) == 0);
CHECK(ecount == 2);
CHECK(secp256k1_ecdh(tctx, res, &point, NULL) == 0);
CHECK(ecount == 3);
CHECK(secp256k1_ecdh(tctx, res, &point, s_one) == 1);
CHECK(ecount == 3);
/* Cleanup */
secp256k1_context_destroy(tctx);
}
void test_ecdh_generator_basepoint(void) {
unsigned char s_one[32] = { 0 };
secp256k1_pubkey point[2];
int i;
s_one[31] = 1;
/* Check against pubkey creation when the basepoint is the generator */
for (i = 0; i < 100; ++i) {
secp256k1_sha256_t sha;
unsigned char s_b32[32];
unsigned char output_ecdh[32];
unsigned char output_ser[32];
unsigned char point_ser[33];
size_t point_ser_len = sizeof(point_ser);
secp256k1_scalar s;
random_scalar_order(&s);
secp256k1_scalar_get_b32(s_b32, &s);
/* compute using ECDH function */
CHECK(secp256k1_ec_pubkey_create(ctx, &point[0], s_one) == 1);
CHECK(secp256k1_ecdh(ctx, output_ecdh, &point[0], s_b32) == 1);
/* compute "explicitly" */
CHECK(secp256k1_ec_pubkey_create(ctx, &point[1], s_b32) == 1);
CHECK(secp256k1_ec_pubkey_serialize(ctx, point_ser, &point_ser_len, &point[1], SECP256K1_EC_COMPRESSED) == 1);
CHECK(point_ser_len == sizeof(point_ser));
secp256k1_sha256_initialize(&sha);
secp256k1_sha256_write(&sha, point_ser, point_ser_len);
secp256k1_sha256_finalize(&sha, output_ser);
/* compare */
CHECK(memcmp(output_ecdh, output_ser, sizeof(output_ser)) == 0);
}
}
void test_bad_scalar(void) {
unsigned char s_zero[32] = { 0 };
unsigned char s_overflow[32] = {
0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff,
0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xfe,
0xba, 0xae, 0xdc, 0xe6, 0xaf, 0x48, 0xa0, 0x3b,
0xbf, 0xd2, 0x5e, 0x8c, 0xd0, 0x36, 0x41, 0x41
};
unsigned char s_rand[32] = { 0 };
unsigned char output[32];
secp256k1_scalar rand;
secp256k1_pubkey point;
/* Create random point */
random_scalar_order(&rand);
secp256k1_scalar_get_b32(s_rand, &rand);
CHECK(secp256k1_ec_pubkey_create(ctx, &point, s_rand) == 1);
/* Try to multiply it by bad values */
CHECK(secp256k1_ecdh(ctx, output, &point, s_zero) == 0);
CHECK(secp256k1_ecdh(ctx, output, &point, s_overflow) == 0);
/* ...and a good one */
s_overflow[31] -= 1;
CHECK(secp256k1_ecdh(ctx, output, &point, s_overflow) == 1);
}
void run_ecdh_tests(void) {
test_ecdh_api();
test_ecdh_generator_basepoint();
test_bad_scalar();
}
#endif